NIXON'S WHITE HOUSE DEATH SQUAD

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Grassroots Opposition to the MX Missile

Stephen Harvey *on Hollywood Legends*

William Stafford *on Women Poets*



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

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

The problem in Iran was not so much an intelligence breakdown as a stupidity buildup

■ Today I don't really think you can talk about problems with the mullahs. Perhaps they moan once in a while, but that really doesn't have any effect. Khomeini? No one refers to him in Iran, except the terrorists. The so-called Islamic-Marxists mention his name sometimes, but that's all.

—SHAH MOHAMMED REZA PAHLEVI, *1976, quoted in the New York Times, Jan. 30, 1979*

Don't give him any more; he's suffered enough

■ Financially, Richard M. Nixon has come a long way since his staunch defender, Rabbi Baruch Korff, claimed four years ago that the former President was strapped for money. By the most conservative of calculations, he is now a millionaire. . . . The federal government has spent a total of $625,642 on Nixon's personal services, travel and office expenses, not including his pensions or Secret Service protection, from his resignation Aug. 9, 1974, through last Sept. 30.

—*Los Angeles Times, Jan. 26, 1979*

Let them eat trestles

■ An old bridge over the Brandywine River in Wilmington [Delaware] has been closed since May. The state applied for Federal aid to rebuild the bridge, which is on a busy traffic artery, at a cost of $6 million, but the request was rejected on the ground that the bridge-replacement program could not consider an application under $10 million.

—*New York Times, Jan. 16, 1979*

Now, that's what we call arms control

■ "SALT will not solve all our problems," [Secretary of Defense Harold Brown] said. "Even with SALT, we will need to—and we will be permitted to—expand our strategic nuclear efforts."

—*Los Angeles Times, Jan. 26, 1979*

How about trying Equal Time?

■ Commercials on Saturday morning television tempt black children to shoplift products that more affluent white children can buy, a Chabot College counselor told a Federal Trade Commission hearing in San Francisco yesterday. "I meet with parents of black children who have been caught shoplifting," said Carolyn Green. "But I've never heard of a black child caught for stealing a carrot."

—*San Francisco Chronicle, Jan. 25, 1979*

Word to the wise

■ A judge in Eureka has ruled that California law bans growing of only one kind of marijuana and therefore testimony about other species of the weed cannot be admitted in a trial. . . . As a result if the judge's ruling, Asst. Dist. Atty. Mike Mock said, he will dismiss charges against Steven Ball, accused of growing illegal marijuana. Attorneys for Ball contended that "cannabis indica" is commonly grown in Humboldt County but that the state law specifically bans only cultivation of "cannabis sativa L," which is said to be a different species of plant.

—*Los Angeles Times, Jan. 5, 1979*

For the record

■ President Carter today will send Congress a "lean and austere" $532-billion budget that . . . calls for a 7.7 percent increase of $38 billion over the current fiscal year, with a deficit of $29 billion.

—*Los Angeles Times, Jan. 22, 1979*

Born again, sort of

■ Mindful of voters' sentiments for fiscal purity and integrity in their politicians, [California] Assembly members said "Amen" to the prayer that opened their session Thursday.

"Almighty God, when we begin to care more for the prestige and perquisites of office than for the responsibility to serve, shake us and bring us back to sanity," said the Rev. Walter Link, the Assembly chaplain.

Several "amens," unusual after the prayer that routinely opens sessions, filtered from the 80 members, who recently received 10 percent pay raises as well as increases in their daily expense money.

—*Los Angeles Times, Jan. 5, 1979*

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Still denying a JFK conspiracy

Press contortions

IN JANUARY, THE HOUSE SELECT COMMITtee on Assassinations issued a report on its two-year, $5 million investigation into the deaths of President Kennedy and Martin Luther King. Kennedy, the committee concluded on the basis of last-minute expert testimony, "was probably assassinated as a result of a conspiracy." Chief counsel Robert Blakey, who was once inclined to support the Warren Commission's findings, acknowledged that there is now "a prima facie case for conspiracy."

This conclusion came as a blow to the establishment press. All these years they had been stoutly defending the "one lone nut" theory, and fully expected vindication from the committee. Surprised by the convincing new evidence of a second gunman, newspapers like the *Washington Post* and the *New York Times* (which rushed the Warren Commission's report into print in 1964) scrambled to defend their positions. Neither paper could do much to dispute the experts' finding that there was a 95-percent probability of a second gunman, but both engaged in fantastic contortions to explain it all away.

At first, the *New York Times* tried to simply ignore the findings. It buried a report of the news—"Experts Say That Second Gunman Almost Certainly Shot at Kennedy"—on page 37, along with the classifieds. When the committee's report drew the logical conclusion that there was "probably" a conspiracy, a *Times* editorial objected that the committee seemed "more interested in inflaming than informing." The *Times* worried that an ignorant public would conjure up dark associations "of malevolence perpetrated by enemies, foreign or political." In order to discourage the public from losing confidence in our political system, the newspaper suggested we think not of "conspiracy" but of "two maniacs instead of one." The *Times*'s tortuous efforts to berate the committee for using the word conspiracy—which, after all, means "a planning or acting together secretly, especially for an unlawful or harmful purpose, such as murder or treason," according to Webster's—reveal its anxieties about the public's reaction.

The *Washington Post*, that other great servant of the truth, likewise objected to the word conspiracy, with its connotations of "a political plot." The existence of a second gunman, the *Post* commented, proves only that Oswald casually met a like-minded malcontent who helped him with the murder. The paper could even envision "as many as three or four social outcasts, with no ties to any one organization, . . . [developing] in some spontaneous way a common determination to express their alienation in the killing of President Kennedy." Multiple madmen, perhaps, but never an organized plot. The *Post* even suggested, in all seriousness, a possibility the *Times* at least had written off as "incredible": that "two persons, acting independently, attempted to shoot the president at the same time."

We hold no special brief for the committee's performance, but the press set a dismal example in its role as critic and watchdog of the investigation. More concerned with defending past commitments than with impartially reviewing the evidence, the press has overlooked important aspects of the report.

For example, the *New York Times* (like the *Post*) flatly stated that the report "pointedly denies all the suggested plots; it was not the Russians, not the Cubans, not the anti-Castro Cuban groups, not the mob, not Federal agents." Therefore, no important political groups could have been involved in a conspiracy. Actually, the committee could offer no clue as to the identity of the second gunman, and beyond offering its best judgment, could not prove a negative, as chief counsel Blakey pointed out. Moreover, the committee repeatedly suggested that certain major organized crime figures—as opposed to the "national crime syndicate"—had the "motive, means, and opportunity" to carry out the assassination. Antagonized by the Kennedy administration's war on organized crime and on the teamsters union, several mob figures had privately threatened Kennedy's life. They were hardly loners or nuts.

The press now also overlooks one of the key lessons of the investigation: Intelligence and law enforcement authorities cannot be counted on when their own interests are at stake. The CIA covered up its own involvement in Castro assassination plots. The FBI tried to steer the investigation in a predetermined direction. Hoover's vendetta against Martin Luther King, recounted in shocking detail during the hearings, was graphic proof of the dangers that large intelligence bureaucracies pose to our freedom. As the Assassination Information Bureau commented, "The struggle to purge the intelligence establishment of its cancer and to bring the secret state under democratic control can make great strides forward at this time by concentrating on the part played by the FBI and the CIA in the investigation and cover-up of JFK's death.

Perhaps another major lesson of the investigation concerns the press itself, and the lengths to which it will go to defend the status quo. Anything but a conspiracy, anything but a political plot, the *Times* and the *Post* cry out. Confronted with evidence that Oswald could not have been a "lone nut," the newspapers have ingeniously offered us a "two lone nuts" theory, a triumph of reasoning out of tight corners if there ever was one. The thought that only a few social misfits—every society has some—were responsible is for them comforting; it serves to bolster the public's sagging confidence in political institutions and law enforcement agencies whose integrity has come under question. The *Times* and the *Post* would relegate all troubling questions to the dust bin. Ultimately, they are more concerned to preserve the façade of social stability than to search for the truth. ❑

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New webs for old

Taiwan resolutions

JUST WHEN IT SEEMED POSSIBLE that the United States might at last disentangle itself from the Chinese civil war, members of Congress are spinning new webs to bind us to Taiwan. Since the opening of the current Congress, senators and representatives of all political complexions have been stumbling over each other in a rush to introduce resolutions that would preserve, to one degree or another, the guarantee of Taiwan's security contained in the mutual defense treaty that will be abrogated at the end of this year. Some of these resolutions are the inventions of congressional conservatives who would like to undo Carter's move to normalize relations with China. Others of them, including a resolution introduced by liberal Senators Alan Cranston and Edward Kennedy, represent an effort by congressmen who support normalization, to shield themselves politically from charges that they have helped sell out Taiwan. Regardless of the motives behind them, all these resolutions would have the same effect of putting the United States back in the line of fire between the Chinese Communists and the Chinese Nationalists.

At the moment, this doesn't seem important to most congressmen, and for good reason. Most military analysts doubt that the People's Republic has the capability to mount an invasion of Taiwan; the straits between the mainland and the island are a formidable natural obstacle to any invasion, and the Taiwan regime has a large and efficient military force at its disposal. Also, for the time being, the Chinese are playing down any suggestion that they might want to take Taiwan by force. During his January visit to Washington, Chinese Vice Premier Teng Hsiao-ping oozed sweet reasonableness on the Taiwan problem, telling members of the House and Senate that the Chinese no longer spoke of "liberating" Taiwan, and that Taiwan could keep its separate economy and armed forces. But Peking has refused explicitly to rule out the use of force against Taiwan, and though such military action seems a remote possibility at the moment, only those with no imagination or memory would doubt that the shifting winds of Asian politics will once again blow up a storm on the Taiwan straits.

How would the United States respond to such a crisis? Predicting the response is difficult, but the resolution introduced by Kennedy and Cranston would require the United States "to act in accordance with constitutional processes . . . to meet any dangers," and to "safeguard the interests, concerns, and expectations of the United States." Although both the senators and the administration argue that passing the resolution will have no impact on how the United States would act in a crisis, it seems clear that giving official sanction to this language—which is lifted from the mutual defense treaty that becomes a relic at the end of the year—can only increase the likelihood that the United States will become involved in some future conflict involving Taiwan.

By normalizing relations with Peking, the United States finally has the chance to end its 30-year involvement in the Chinese civil war. Senators Cranston and Kennedy should have the courage to accept that opportunity. Surely they have no business encouraging our government to renew its commitment to guarding the last redoubt of the losers of 1949. ❏

"If you seek his monument . . ."

Nelson Rockefeller, RIP

THE GREAT SHOCK AT HEARING OF the sudden death of Nelson Rockefeller was the startling realization that now he would never get to be President of the United States. Millions of Americans grew up with the firm conviction, whether they liked it or not, that Nelson's sweep into the Presidency would be as inevitable as the tides or the movements of the stars. He seemed an irresistible force, backed by an Eastern establishment that appeared to possess limitless amounts of money, power, and intellectual and media support. That despite these enormous advantages, Nelson never quite reached the height of power, should tell us that nothing is really inevitable and that, in the last analysis, a benign Providence watches over the fortunes of the United States.

Before the 1950s it was unthinkable that a Rockefeller should aspire to high office in the United States. The Rockefellers had once been the most hated family in the country, the very symbol of the "malefactors of great wealth" denounced by populists and muckrakers. But for four decades, publicists such as old John D.'s aide Ivy Lee

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were busy refurbishing the Rockefeller image, stressing humanitarian philanthropies and the Rockefellers' "liberalism." For generations, the Rockefellers had been content to exercise their political power through others, first through Ohio Republicans and later, when the dynasty moved to New York, through the New York party.

In particular through their Chase National (later Chase Manhattan) Bank, the Rockefellers exercised control over the "liberal" wing of the New York Republican party that was headed by Governor Thomas E. Dewey. In a rare episode that suddenly exposed behind-the-scenes political power, Winthrop W. Aldrich, Nelson's uncle and chairman of the board of the Chase Bank, imperiously summoned Governor Dewey to his chambers and successfully urged him to run for reelection. During the Eisenhower administration John Foster Dulles, former foreign policy adviser to Dewey, served as Secretary of State; few people knew that Dulles's wife, Janet Pomeroy Avery, was John D. Rockefeller, Jr.'s first cousin. Robert Taft, Sr., complained with no little justice in 1952 that "every Republican candidate for president since 1936 has been chosen by the Chase Bank."

But in 1958, Nelson Rockefeller's candidacy for governor struck the political world like a thunderclap. It meant that the Rockefellers were now confident enough to strike out for political power in the open and under their own bold banner. Just as David was to be the banker, and John D. III the philanthropist, so Nelson was to be the politician of the family.

Nelson seemed to have everything, and he swept New York politics before him. As a liberal Republican he was able to muscle the Republicans, while appealing to many liberal Democrats. Above all there was the charisma, the toughness, the cool and open drive for power; behind every smiling "Hi ya, fella," there were the cold, beady eyes of a ruthless seeker after domination.

In his reign as governor, Nelson forged an irresistible coalition: The real estate and construction interests, as well as the construction unions, were his for life as he sharply raised taxes and incurred deficits in order to build such useless boondoggles as the $1.5 billion Albany Mall (later renamed the Nelson Rockefeller Empire State Plaza) and the monumental World Trade Center towers in New York City. The Trade Center had to be packed with state government bureaus in order to survive at all, and Nelson's taste for monuments and grandeur reinforced the impression of many New Yorkers that here was another Caesar come to direct their destinies.

Nelson's policies were the epitome of Cold War liberalism, of aggrandizing governmental power in all matters, economic and personal, domestic and foreign. In his early years, Nelson was the leading drumbeater for the national mania for fallout shelters: Millions of school children were told that they could successfully avoid nuclear destruction by cowering under their desks, or trotting dutifully to the basement. For a while, New York was subjected to compulsory air raid drills, until public resistance forced an end to the program.

Nelson was characteristically tough and imperial in the way he tackled the problem of drug abuse. His approach was draconian: long jail sentences for heroin pushers and addicts. The Rockefeller program, which of course proved finally to be a fiasco, was the epitome of the belief in treating a social or medical problem with jail and the billy club.

Nelson also built up a formidable political machine, via large and continuing gifts and unpaid "loans" to his aides and confidants. And yet he never reached his ultimate goal. His abrasive methods and personality aggravated the split between conservative and Rockefeller Republicans, until an ugly schism between the two forces was displayed on television at the 1964 convention. When Rockefeller and his wing openly deserted Barry Goldwater to support Lyndon Johnson that year, Nelson seemed doomed to be thwarted in his open yearning for the highest office in the land.

Still, there was a final chance. When Richard Nixon was nominated for President in 1968, he picked the unknown Spiro Agnew for Vice President at the urging of Rockefeller, and he did so to appease the liberal wing of his party. The peccadilloes of Agnew, once a Rockefeller Republican in Maryland, were later uncovered by U.S. Attorney George Beall, a Rockefeller Republican from the same state. Thus when Nixon was ousted from office his successor would not be the newly-conservative Agnew, but Gerald Ford, who was congenial to the Rockefeller wing of the party.

When Ford chose Nelson Rockefeller to be Vice President, it seemed to many conspiracy theorists that their phantasms had at last been confirmed; in the old cliché, Nelson Rockefeller was now "only a heartbeat away" from the pinnacle of power.

But fortunately, he never made it to the top, and as Vice President Rockefeller had to confine himself to conducting an elaborate whitewash of the CIA that managed to preserve all of the agency's power intact behind a façade of investigation and supposedly imposed restraint.

In the end, Nelson was not to achieve his heart's desire, and Jimmy Carter was sworn in as President. But if Nelson never achieved his seeming destiny as our Caesar, he did have the satisfaction of having his longtime personal foreign policy adviser, Henry Kissinger, serve as the unchallenged foreign policy czar of both the Nixon and Ford administrations. And the further satisfaction of seeing Henry the K. succeeded by brother David's crew from the Trilateral Commission, from Carter and Mondale down through Brzezinski and the top layers of the State and Treasury departments. At the end, Nelson and the other Rockefellers had to fall back on their time-honored tactic of achieving power through others, but perhaps, as usual, they accomplished more that way than they could have on their own. ❑



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

DEDE FELDMAN

Citizens versus the MX

IMAGINE A STATE THE SIZE of, say, Connecticut, isolated from the rest of the United States. Across this Connecticut-sized area huge trucks, each carrying a hundred-ton nuclear missile, roll back and forth, endlessly, from one hole to another. Now add decoys, and shuttle them around with the real missiles, at night, and during the day.

If you think this sounds crazy, you should hear what the governor of Kansas said when *he* heard about the plans the air force is making for the MX missile.

"I find this proposal utterly unbelievable and inconceivable," Governor Robert F. Bennett said in a letter last October to President Carter. "I would not be concerned if it was a pipe dream of some Washington bureaucrat, but I'm informed that the air force is moving into full scale development and site selection by next summer, and acquisition of potential land for the MX within a year."

For several years, air force officials have been concerned that by the 1980s, ICBMs will be vulnerable to Soviet attack. Their response has been to push for a mobile missile system, called the MX, which would be deployed in one or more of seven "geotechnically suitable" sites in the western United States. If the air force has its way, the missiles will be shuttled from silo to silo in underground trenches or by truck. The idea, of course, is to fool the Soviets about the exact location of a few missiles perpetually in motion among thousands of holes.

DEDE FELDMAN, a writer in Albuquerque, New Mexico, specializes in energy policy and military affairs.

What Bennett and others in states selected as potential sites are worried about is not just the bizarre nature of the new system or even its $40 billion price tag. What concerns them, is that the scheme requires from 4000 to 19,000 square miles of land now used by farmers, sportsmen, and others in Arizona, New Mexico, Nebraska, Colorado, Kansas, California, Nevada, and Texas. That makes nuclear weapons a local issue.

The amount of land to be withdrawn from all other uses in these areas depends on what "basing mode" the air force chooses for the MX and what type of security it puts into effect around the missiles. At one point, the air force was considering shuttling the missiles along tracks in buried trenches, locating them under shallow ponds, even sinking them in quicksand. More recently, White House officials have suggested placing the missiles aboard large aircraft and either firing them from the air or landing at small airstrips to launch them. But the basing mode most popular among air force officials now is the multiple-aim-point system in which missiles would be shuttled from silo to silo above ground in trucks. And that requires a lot of land—from approximately 5400 square miles of it in the South Platte plains to 7000 square miles near the White Sands missile range in New Mexico.

Conservative Nebraska farmers ask, "Where are our human rights now?"

Local concern over the MX was aroused last year when the air force released a five-volume environmental impact statement about the missile. The massive document pinpoints seven areas where the MX might be deployed: the central Nevada great basin, the Mojave Desert in California, the White Sands region of New Mexico, the Luke/Yuma area between Arizona and California, west Texas, the high plains between Texas and New Mexico, and the South Platte plains in Nebraska, Colorado, and Kansas.

The proposed MX sites include not only land owned by the federal government, but also privately owned land used for farming and ranching in Texas, Nebraska, Kansas, Colorado, and New Mexico. The private lands on the plains and in west Texas are productive agricultural areas. The South Platte plains produce $41,000 worth of agricultural products per square mile and the New Mexico–Texas high plains produce $86,000 worth of crops per mile, making it, according to the air force, the most agriculturally productive area in the country. The federal lands are owned either by the Bureau of Land Management or the Department of Defense. In New Mexico these lands are leased for oil and mineral exploration, and elsewhere they are used as recreation areas, wildlife refuges, and wilderness.

Whether the land is publicly or privately owned, the impact of the MX on the sites finally selected is sure to be drastic. According to the impact statement, building the MX would spur a local construction boom, attracting new population and outstripping the ability of rural communities to supply services. More important, where the land is privately owned, deploying the MX would mean moving people from their homes. For example, under one of the air force's security options for the South Platte plains, the environmental impact statement states that 70,000 people living in the affected zone would have to be "relocated"; in the high plains, $1.7 billion worth of agricultural production would be "displaced" each year.

Public officials in several states are alarmed by the tremendous amounts of power that would be required to build and run the MX. Kansas Governor Robert Bennett says energy requirements for the MX in his state alone would be equivalent to a city of 50,000 people, and Nebraska State Senator Steve Fowler has wondered aloud whether the huge energy requirements in his state will necessitate the construction of a nuclear power plant.

The environmental impact statement admits that locating the MX in the New Mexico–Texas plains would

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indeed require a new generating facility. In addition, the impact statement estimates water requirements for the MX to range from a minimum of 3 billion gallons per year to a maximum of 12 billion, a figure large enough to send chills down the spine of many a farmer, especially in the Southwest.

Environmentalists are concerned that the MX presents a direct threat to the habitats of many birds and animals, some of them on the endangered species list. In New Mexico, for example, a potential MX site is located near one of the few refuges used by whooping cranes. The site is also home for peregrine falcons and contains the archaeological remains of early Indian tribes.

THE ECONOMIC AND social costs of deploying the MX are dwarfed by another consideration: What would happen if war breaks out? Residents living near potential MX sites got a particularly vivid answer to that question when, in a rather unfortunate choice of words, General Lew Allen, Jr., chief of staff of the air force, said that the idea behind the MX was to "deploy a great sponge of targets in the United States to absorb the Soviet warheads, making a surprise attack look futile to the Kremlin." If the possibility of losing their water, their farms, and their livelihoods didn't do it, the prospect of becoming a target for a nuclear warhead was enough to send many residents straight to the town meeting hall.

Local opposition to the MX missile first surfaced last summer in Arizona, where two areas are potential MX sites, but public concern was first aroused when the Defense Nuclear Agency began conducting high-explosives tests in the northwestern part of the state to see what impact a direct enemy hit would have on an MX buried in an underground trench.

Last June, before the first of the two high-explosives tests, Tucson's Animal Defense League tried to get an eleventh-hour injunction prohibiting the blast. The league contended that the agency had not prepared an adequate environmental impact statement and that the blast would destroy the habitats of several endangered species, and indeed the animals themselves.

In August, before the second explosion, the Colorado River Indian tribe came out strongly against the test. Their reservation is 20 miles west of the test site and south of Lake Havasu City. Between Lake Havasu City and the reservation lies the Parker Dam, and the tribe was worried about the effect of the blast on the dam, as well as damage to Indian archaeological resources located in a basin between the reservation and the test site. The detonations occurred despite the protests.

Meanwhile, in Tucson, opponents of the tests had begun to focus on the underlying cause of the tests: the development of the MX. Carrying signs saying, "You Can't Eat Missiles," and wearing buttons marked "Bury the MX," about twenty people marched around the Tucson Federal Building to protest the August test. The Stop MX Coalition in Tucson is requesting public hearings in Arizona on the MX —so far without success.

In neighboring New Mexico, another group opposed to MX, the Coalition to Stop the MX Missile, is just beginning to lobby the state's conservative congressional delegation to oppose deploying the mobile missile in any of the three sites the air force is considering in the state. The concerns of the New Mexico group include the loss of farm and ranching land in the eastern part of the state, depletion of scarce ground water reserves that will be used to construct and maintain the project, and the prospect of becoming a prime nuclear-strike zone in case of a war.

But while the peace-oriented Coalition to Stop the MX, centered in Albuquerque, is well informed on details surrounding the proposed missile, many New Mexicans who live in areas the air force has pinpointed as potential sites have no idea what's going on. Newspapers in Artesia, Clovis, Lordsburg, and other small New Mexico towns have run few articles on the MX, and the environmental impact statement that enraged citizens in other areas is available only at the state's two largest universities.

The Clayton–Union County Chamber of Commerce, in eastern New Mexico, has actually gone on record in favor of having missile sites in the area. Dreaming of hundreds of new jobs, local supporters of the MX talk of "landing" the missile project the same way they landed the country's largest wind generator, which now supplies one-fifth of their electricity. And according to the *Union County Leader*, they're getting some support from the state's congressional delegation, which, with one exception, supports both the MX and the multiple-aim-point system.

BRUCE MCGILLIVRAY

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The air force wants to seize up to 19,000 acres for its MX shell game.

The response of Clayton residents stands in marked contrast to that of citizens living in the South Platte plains, another agricultural area where the MX might be deployed.

Residents of the flat, wheat- and corn-growing country that spreads across Nebraska, Kansas, and Colorado, first heard about the MX from Nebraskans for Peace, a group in Lincoln that is trying to halt the arms race. "People around here are a conservative lot—family farmers, sons and daughters of immigrants who have farmed the land for generations. They're in favor of a strong defense posture, and, for the most part, they trust the government," says Kevin Johnson, editor of the *Benkelman Post and News Chronicle*. "So the initial reaction to the MX—and especially to the fact that the air force might take away their farms for the project—was absolute shock. Some people still don't believe it."

But as the initial shock wore off, anger took over. Farmers and their wives were especially upset by the fact that the environmental impact statement had not been made available to them, and that they had only two weeks to comment, once they found out about the air force plan. The result was a veritable flurry of meetings throughout Kansas, Nebraska, and Colorado, and a torrent of letters to public officials, newspapers, and the air force. In the heaviest reaction from any state, some 2500 Nebraskans, by letter and petition, made known their opposition to the MX. Many of the letters to the air force were handwritten, many from women and school children. Some of the angriest were from public officials.

"Why was the public given such a short time to respond?" asked Ralph Conrad, chairman of the Kit Carson (Kansas) Board of County Commissioners, in a letter to the air force. "Where is our freedom any more?" "This is government by the government and not by the people," the mayor of Burlington, Colorado told the air force.

Residents were irritated particularly that the environmental impact statement managed to describe the area without mentioning its two chief crops: corn and wheat. "We produce $46 million worth of wheat per year in the five counties in southwestern Nebraska alone," says John Wallace, president of the Nebraska Wheatgrowers Association. "We've developed this land through private enterprise, irrigated it, and worked it from sun up until sun down. My own grandfather homesteaded our farm and I bought the rest at public auction. Our deed says forever, but now Uncle Sam's coming around saying, 'I was just kidding.' Now that's hard to swallow. You wonder where are the human rights we hear them talking about so often."

"Yuma County, Colorado, produces more shelled corn than any area in the country and there are 40,000 head of cattle in the county," says Ralph Spillman, a mortician and a city councilman from Yuma. "People here are worried about the disruption of all they've worked for."

Although the air force has not specified how much land would need to be taken out of production for the 20-year life of the MX project, the figure most Nebraskans refer to is about 5000 square miles. But even if one of the air force's less drastic security plans were adopted, farmers say that would disrupt the area's circular irrigation systems, making farming uneconomical.

Attendance at the town meetings in the South Platte area was overwhelming: 400 in Yuma, 600 in Ogallala, 400 in Goodland. Representatives of almost every local organization, including the Southwest Nebraska Council of Governments, the American Agriculture Movement, the Rocky Mountain Farmers Union, the Cornhuskers Council of Governments, Women in Farm Economics, and the Wheatgrowers Association, rose to denounce the MX. The Nebraskans for Peace pointed out that if the MX were located there the area would be a prime target in time of war. Others asked about the possibility of a traffic accident with radiological consequences, citing an incident in Rock, Kansas, involving liquid fuel Titan missiles, in which an air force man was killed and nearby farms had to be evacuated. Still others asked if their state would become part of "the great sponge" of targets. One man at the Kansas meeting said simply, to a burst of applause, "When you go back to Washington, tell 'em we don't want 'em."

Air force representatives attended two meetings to present their case and to brief the local population. While air force officers listened politely to the farmers, they were careful to call their meetings "briefings," not "hearings." Major Allen Sabsevitz, the air force briefer, could not answer many questions because, he said, the decision on the MX was too far in the future for consideration of specifics on each site.

Predictably, response to the briefings was confusion—then anger. "There's no way you can characterize what went on as a hearing. It was just a PR man giving out the air force line," said Shirley Parks. "And personally, I don't like to be patronized." Parks said her organization was going to keep their eyes on the MX.

Concerning the briefings, Sabsevitz, a public information officer from Norton air force base, says jovially, "You've got to expect this kind of response when it's a question of private land."

THE MX IS NOT THE FIRST strategic system that has become a local issue. Both the Trident submarine and the navy's Seafarer project have been targets of citizen protest in California, Washington, Michigan, Wisconsin, and Connecticut. Grounds for opposition to the Pentagon's plans vary: Opponents range from conservationists in Michigan who don't want underground wires through wilderness areas, to veterans of the antiwar movement of the sixties, who this year went "over the fence" to protest basing Trident subs in Puget Sound in Washington.

For almost 10 years now the navy has been trying to find a hospitable home for its Seafarer submarine communications system. Originally named Sanguine, the $500 million project is an extremely low-frequency submarine communication system that would permit disruption-free radio transmissions to submarines. At present, submarines must surface and trail wires

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to communicate with the mainland, which increases their vulnerability and prevents the rapid communications with missile-firing subs that would be necessary in case of a nuclear war. The answer to this problem, according to the navy, is a system consisting of 4000 miles of underground cables arranged in tic-tac-toe patterns, capable of communicating with subs by low-frequency radio.

In 1967, when the navy first proposed the project, then called Sanguine, the site it selected, for geological reasons, was Wisconsin's Laurentian sheath. But Wisconsin residents raised such a storm of protest in 1973 when the navy installed an experimental Sanguine network in a northern wilderness that the service, with a push from former Wisconsin Representative and then-Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird, retreated to Texas.

But Texans raised the same kinds of environmental questions, and the navy began looking at federal land in New Mexico and Nevada. In New Mexico the navy ran into another opponent: the army.

Army officers at White Sands missile range, which occupied the same land in southern New Mexico that the navy wanted to use for Seafarer cables, said that the navy system would interfere with weapons testing going on there. According to the army, the interference would mean the loss of between 1800 and 3600 jobs, with a payroll of $28 to $58 million.

Horrified by the prospect of such an economic loss, officials of neighboring cities raised their voices in protest. At hearings held in Las Cruces in 1977, Mayor Albert Johnson read a resolution from city commissioners citing the possibility of "serious economic decline" in the Las Cruces area if Seafarer were located there. Nearby, the defense-oriented Alamogordo Chamber of Commerce went on record against Seafarer, and the governor of the state, who is from Las Cruces, asked for state veto power over the project.

In New Mexico and in Nevada citizen resistance to Seafarer got a boost from an unexpected source: the navy's own environmental impact statement, which said that for geological reasons it would cost about $200 million more to locate Seafarer in either state than in the navy's first choice—the upper peninsula of Michigan.

But Michigan residents had their own ideas about Seafarer. The eight upper-peninsula counties that would be affected by the underground cable system voted it down in separate referendums; in the state as a whole public sentiment runs against the project four to one. Most local opposition is based on environmental concerns. Seafarer's potential neighbors are worried that the project will disturb wildlife, tear up the wilderness, and expose animals and humans to radiation; and that Seafarer's radiowaves could electrify fences, knock out TV and radio stations, or even alter human brain waves.

Some Michigan residents were upset about the treatment they were getting from the navy. Virginia Prentice, leader of the Sierra Club's task force on Sanguine/Seafarer, pointed to "continuous obfuscation of facts, plans, and statement of intent on the part of the navy," and Michigan Governor Milliken accused the navy of suppressing a report that showed that exposure to extremely low frequency waves led to an increase of triglycerides in the bloodstream, associated with heart disease.

The navy's proposal for "Seafarer" threatens Michigan, Wisconsin, Nevada, and other states with a major ecological disaster.

Finally, in March 1977, amid growing opposition to Seafarer, Governor Milliken vetoed the project and asked the navy to take its plans and leave the state. But Milliken, who had been promised the power of the veto by President Gerald Ford and Presidential candidate Jimmy Carter, still doesn't know whether his veto will stick. Carter is now deciding what to do about Seafarer. On the one side stands the navy and the $130 million already spent studying and shopping for Seafarer; on the other, Carter's 1976 campaign promise to Michigan residents that Seafarer would not be located there against their wishes.

Opposition to the $40 billion Trident submarine program is centered in three states—Connecticut, where General Dynamics is building the first seven subs; California, where Lockheed is manufacturing the missiles themselves; and Washington, where the subs will eventually be based.

IN THE SEATTLE AREA, opposition to Trident began five years ago with a group of homeowners who were, as the name of their group implied, "Concerned About Trident." Their concern was based on fears that a major naval facility would disrupt the rural, small-town style of life characteristic of the area, bringing in its place a boom-town atmosphere that would put strains on local sewers, schools, and, ultimately, pocketbooks.

As concern about Trident grew, another more activist organization, the Pacific Life Community, began a public educational campaign that culminated in May 1978 with a rally at the Trident base that drew 5000 people from all over the West Coast. Of these 5000 demonstrators, 290 were arrested for going over the fence and onto federal property.

Trident's opponents in other areas such as Santa Cruz, California, and Connecticut emphasize Trident's role in escalating the arms race and are pressing for the conversion of military facilities to peaceful uses.

While local groups protest against these strategic systems, the Pentagon is pushing ahead with its request for funds to begin full-scale development of the MX this year, although the exact basing mode remains a question. Carter's Defense Department is now asking for a total of more than one billion dollars to proceed with the program, including $675 million for supplemental 1979, and $423 million for fiscal 1980.

With angry constituents putting pressure on congressmen from the western states, the MX may face some problems. Peace groups like SANE are also raising difficult questions about the new weapon's relationship to SALT II, and 50 members of Congress, upset about the multiple-aim-point basing mode, have written Carter asking for a top-level study.

These protests make clear that nuclear weapons are no longer just a national issue decided by the specialists in Washington. They are a very real local concern, and everyone, from mortician to Indian chief, has a stake in the outcome.

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not-so-

IN COMMON CAUSE

In fact, Common Cause is a lobby for those who would like to keep things pretty much the way they are.

By STEPHEN CHAPMAN

"*EVERYBODY'S ORGANIZED BUT THE PEOPLE.*" That was the slogan used by John W. Gardner seven years ago in launching a membership drive for Common Cause, his new, self-styled "citizens' lobby." If it was true then, it's not true any more. "The people"—at least those who defer to John Gardner as their guardian—are now one of the best-organized lobbies in Washington, and one of the biggest and best-financed. Who would have guessed that in a nation distinctive for its tradition of interest-group bargaining, the people could be a force for change? In a town where idealistic "public interest" lobbies are lodged on every street corner, as transient as Capitol Hill secretaries and leaving no deeper imprint on national policy, Common Cause has written an uncommon success story.

Created seemingly *ex nihilo* by a bland former HEW secretary with the patrician bearing and ostentatious piety of an Episcopalian vicar, the group swelled in three years to 314,000 members. With the dispersal of President Nixon's criminal clan, Common Cause's numbers have fallen to 250,000, but its prestige and clout on Capitol Hill have continued to grow. The *National Journal*, a highly regarded weekly on politics and government, recently reported that, in addition to achievements in Washington, Common Cause has gotten legislative reforms enacted by every state: an accomplishment probably unmatched by any lobby group, private or public interest, in American history. Its success has the breathtaking quality of some good-government fairy tale come to life, with Gardner cast as a wily Mr. Smith doing things Jimmy Stewart never would have dreamed of.

Much of the credit goes to Gardner, for a decade now the nation's chief custodian of high-mindedness. Although he resigned as president in 1977, Common Cause remains largely his lengthened shadow, and he continues to be active on the group's governing board. Gardner has his office in the same building as Common Cause's, and there is no evidence of a change of policy since he left the helm.

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Though he is now a familiar spokesman for the public interest, surely there never was a less likely tribune of the masses. In credentials and thinking, Gardner embodies the American establishment in whose bosom he has spent most of his adult life. It is fitting, therefore, that Gardner's Common Cause group relied on the wealthy and established for start-up money, has pushed proposals that lend themselves to manipulation by the elite, and in practice serves as a lobbying group for the upper middle class.

After doing his undergraduate work at Stanford and getting his Ph.D. in psychology in 1938 from the University of California, Gardner taught at two posh women's colleges, Connecticut College and Mount Holyoke, before enlisting in the marines in 1942. From there he went to work for the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), the forerunner of the CIA; in the OSS he assisted Harvard psychologist Henry Alexander Murray, and after the war Murray found Gardner a job at the Carnegie Corporation.

In 1947, Gardner saw that the new international role assumed by the United States needed better backup in the universities. Together with his colleagues at the Carnegie Corporation, he approached Harvard University with a proposal for an interdisciplinary research institute that would examine America's foe in the emerging Cold War. To head this new Russian Research Center, Gardner and the Carnegie staff suggested anthropologist Clyde Kluckhohn, like Gardner a veteran of the OSS. The center was set up, and is still active.

Gardner was the man who persuaded James B. Conant to write his famous reports on the American high school for the Carnegie Corporation. Besides serving as president of Harvard and as a diplomat, Conant had been the planner in charge of the atomic bomb for the Office of Scientific Research during World War II. He had frankly set forth his aims for the American high school in a series of lectures in 1952 in which he enlisted education in the Cold War and lashed out at parochial schools as a "threat to our democratic unity." Afterwards, Gardner signed him up to write the Conant Reports, which advocated increased centralization of the public schools and came out at a time when the orbiting of sputnik, in Gardner's words, "led the

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American people to take a fresh look at their educational system."

As Elizabeth Drew once noted, Gardner keeps a photo of Conant on his office wall. Gardner also keeps a photo of another of his heroes in his office: Abraham Flexner, whose report on medical schools in 1910 was the principal propaganda weapon of the American Medical Association in gaining control over the admission of new doctors into the profession via licensing laws and the regulation of medical schools. Gardner's hero was the most influential twentieth-century spokesman for the medical cartel, which has succeeded in keeping the number of doctors low and the price of health care high. In addition, from his position on the Rockefeller-financed General Education Board, which had provided much of the money for the medical school campaign and which dominated northern philanthropic support of black education, Flexner orchestrated, beginning in 1914, a largely successful effort to reduce the number of black liberal arts colleges and channel black education in the South in the direction of vocational training.

Gardner remained at the Carnegie Corporation for twenty years, becoming president in 1955 and churning out the kind of books—for example, the gracefully titled *Excellence: Can We Be Equal and Excellent Too?*—one might expect of a fourth-rate mind whose owner had long forgotten the distinction between financial success and intellectual quality. When he finally let himself be lured away from the sanctuary of the well-intentioned, it was to advance the creation of the Great Society, one of the most spectacular and extravagant failures of our time. In January 1968, perhaps sensing that the ship had sprung a leak, Gardner made his escape. Although Common Cause would later lobby intensely to end American involvement in Southeast Asia, when Gardner left the administration he went out of his way to insist that his departure signaled no break with President Johnson on the war. This was only weeks before old hawks like Robert McNamara and Clark Clifford began urging the President to take measures to reduce American involvement. And no one should forget that Gardner was quick to dismiss the participants in the campus anti-war movement as "playpen revolutionaries."

On the home front Gardner nurtured the corporate state.

All this looks like an incongruous background for a man who claims to speak for an "organized citizenry" in order to "revitalize 'the System' and change the nation's disastrous course," as he put it in 1971. Just exactly when Gardner was born again as a populist remains a mystery, and some wonder whether such a conversion ever in fact took place. Certainly nothing in his numerous activities—which have included serving as a director of Shell Oil, the New York Telephone Company, Time, Inc., and American Airlines—suggests any special closeness to the people.

But perhaps most noteworthy in the career of John Gardner is his special relationship with the Rockefeller family. Not long after leaving HEW Gardner was named a trustee of the Rockefeller Brothers Fund, with which he had been associated since the 1950s. Some of the fund's contributions support innocuous activities—assisting theater groups and financing a variety of civic projects—but some underwrite activities considerably less innocent.

The fund originally was set up by Nelson Rockefeller, who had decided that the nation required his counsel on military and foreign policy. Accordingly, he rounded up like-minded scholars, journalists, government officials, and other distinguished citizens to prepare reports on such matters. The studies issued by the Rockefeller Brothers Fund, as might be expected, took an interventionist, anti-Communist line of the most bellicose and alarmist type. One in particular, "International Security: The Military Aspect," boosted the career of a then obscure Harvard professor named Henry Kissinger, who supervised its preparation.

Kissinger's report warned ominously that "the United States is rapidly losing its lead over the USSR in the military race . . . Unless present trends are reversed, the world balance will shift in favor of the Soviet bloc." (Remember, this was 1957.) To prevent such a shift, the study urged increased military spending and a new drive to build bomb shelters to protect the citizenry in case of a nuclear war—which the signatories thought was imminent. It also advised Americans to put aside their misgivings about using every available means to further the aims of their government's foreign policy: "The willingness to engage in nuclear war, when necessary, is part of the price of our freedom." In this grim march to Armageddon, John Gardner was in perfect lock step.

WHEN NOT PROMOTING THE CAUSE OF interventionist liberalism in foreign policy, Gardner has been nurturing the corporate state at home. He has continually stressed the importance of a "partnership" between government and business. In such partnerships the government usually channels public money to big corporations or puts private institutions to work to further an expansionist foreign policy. For example, Gardner endorsed federal subsidies to build the supersonic transport plane, a venture that the private aircraft industry knew would be unprofitable without massive government help. And even today he can, with a straight face, cite the health care industry as an exemplary case of government and the private sector working together: "Now on medicare we find the insurance companies sharing with the government the task of setting up the actual system. The National Institutes spend over a billion dollars a year, $900 million of which goes to the universities. And all of that $900 million is allocated by committees of doctors and scientists acting as consultants to the national government."

Gardner gave further clues about his vision of this "partnership" in the 1967 "Katzenbach Report," which he wrote with Under Secretary of State Nicholas Katzenbach and CIA Director Richard Helms. The report endorsed CIA infiltration of and covert use of private American organizations abroad (except educational and charitable ones) whenever necessary to protect "overriding national security interests." It also recommended providing public funds to assist "organizations which are adjudged deserving, in the national interest, of public support." As to exactly what sort of organizations and activities should get such help, the report was deliberately vague.

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Following his stint in Lyndon Johnson's cabinet, Gardner became head of the National Urban Coalition, a do-good outfit that trumpeted its concern with promoting racial harmony and reinvigorating the nation's cities. The record he compiled at the NUC is hardly more encouraging than the one he left at HEW. One of his favorite causes was urban renewal. Even in 1969 it should have been clear to anyone who was paying attention that urban renewal did nothing to help the poor. Usually such programs meant razing shabby slum homes and forcing their occupants out into the streets, compelling them to find other, generally more expensive housing. And for what purpose? The older homes were replaced by comfortable, modern buildings that housed a more affluent class of people. The poor were generally the losers, because urban renewal eliminated much low-cost housing, and in the cheap housing that remained, rents rose because all those people needed an inexpensive place to live. The tenants who moved into the new dwellings were generally better off financially than their predecessors; they benefited from the increased supply of middle-class housing and from the lower rents in such housing that followed. Building contractors and construction workers of course profited from the government's subsidization of new housing construction.

At the NUC, Gardner also espoused the cause of urban mass transit. The record of such projects as San Francisco's Bay Area Rapid Transit (BART) and Washington's Metro since then provides little support for mass transit as a solution to transportation problems of the cities. These efforts have been extravagantly expensive. One editorial in the *Wall Street Journal* calculated that Metro could have provided each of its riders with an automobile for less than the cost of building a subway. As in urban renewal, mass transit involves taxes that take from the poor to give to the rich. A casual observer can't help but be struck by the predominance of affluent-looking whites on either Metro or BART, an imbalance that has been confirmed by surveys. Says transportation economist George Hilton: "The trip from suburban areas into the central business district in rush hours has become more and more the province of high-income commuters, as retailing and clerical employment have deserted central business districts for the suburbs."

NUC's victories under Gardner's direction, however, were few. The coalition was a flabby-minded anachronism that lacked a distinctive approach to the nation's problems, a systematic means of getting its views translated, and a broad base of support across the land. By 1968, it seemed that even liberals had begun to lose faith in traditional liberal approaches to public policy.

John Gardner learned from the NUC's errors in organizing, if not in policy matters. Common Cause would suffer none of the handicaps that proved so debilitating to his first venture into lobbying. To launch his next crusade he got plenty of seed money to pay for an expensive recruiting blitz, including full-page advertisements in all the liberal magazines and a direct-mail campaign that reached two and a half million prospective concerned citizens. In no time he had himself one of the biggest political organizations around—so large that speculation soon spread that Gardner saw the organization as a launching pad for a presidential race as a third-party candidate. And at annual dues of $15 and close to 300,000 members, Common Cause soon had so much cash that by 1974 it was officially spending more on lobbying than anyone else in Washington.

Crucial to the organization's survival was the $250,000 Gardner obtained to finance the initial membership drive. Given his connections, one should not be surprised that the original donors read like a Who's Who of the American establishment. The fattest cat, John D. Rockefeller III, gave $25,000. Other large contributions came from Howard Stein, who heads the Dreyfus Corporation; Sol Linowitz, former chairman of the board of Xerox who recently was a negotiator of the Panama Canal treaty; John Hay Whitney, former publisher of the *New York Herald-Tribune* who was U.S. ambassador to Great Britain; Roy Larsen and Andrew Heiskell, respectively publisher and president of Time, Inc.; Walter Haas, former president and chairman of the board of Levi Strauss; and William Golden, trustee of the Mitre Corporation and the New York City Rand Institute, and public member of the Hudson Institute.

But the money that soon began pouring in from ordinary members still did not wean Common Cause away from establishment funding. Since the beginning, donations from people named Rockefeller add up to some $72,000, according to Common Cause. Numerous other recent backers have ties to the Rockefellers, including several present or former members of the influential Council on Foreign Relations (chaired by David Rockefeller). CFR members who have given $500 or more to Common Cause include Stanley Marcus, head of the chic Neiman-Marcus stores; William S. Paley, chairman of CBS; Thomas J. Watson, Jr., chairman of the executive committee of IBM; plus Linowitz and Golden. Other Rockefeller cronies on the list of contributors include Charles Dyson, a corporation executive and member of the council of Rockefeller University; Mrs. A. H. Sulzberger, wife of the publisher of the *New York Times*; Mary Scranton, wife of former Pennsylvania governor William Scranton, who is himself a member of the Rockefeller-sponsored Trilateral Commission and a director of such corporations as IBM, the *New York Times*, and Bethlehem Steel; J. Irwin Miller, board chairman of the Cummins Engine Co., a trustee of the Ford Foundation, and promoter of Nelson Rockefeller for President; and industrialist William Hewlett, former chief executive officer and president of Hewlett-Packard and a director of David Rockefeller's Chase Manhattan Bank.

Original donors to Common Cause read like a Who's Who.

COMMON CAUSE'S SUPPORT FROM SUCH wealthy establishment bigwigs has inflamed the imagination of more than one conspiracy theorist. One wonders how these contributions can be justified in the mind of John Gardner, who once wrote, "The most serious obstacle the citizen faces when he sets out to participate is that someone with a lot of money got there first and bought up the public address system . . . It isn't just that money talks. It talks louder and longer and drowns out the citizen's hoarse whisper." Except, of course, at Common Cause, where only the voice of the people is

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SOME OF THE COMMON PEOPLE WHOSE MONEY SUPPORTS COMMON CAUSE

(past and present affiliations given for the purpose of identification only)

Leona Baumgartner
New York City Department of Health, Commissioner of Health
New York Foundation, Executive director

William Benton
Benton & Bowles Advertising Agency, Founder and chairman of the board
Encyclopedia Britannica and Encyclopedia Britannica Films, Chairman
Committee for Economic Development, Executive committee, board of trustees
U.S. Senator from Connecticut

Benjamin Buttenwieser
U.S. assistant high commissioner for Germany
Kuhn, Loeb & Co., Advisory board
Tishman Realty & Construction Co., Director

Randolph Parker Compton
Lazard Frères & Co., Vice president
Kidder, Peabody & Co., Vice president
Fund for Peace, Chairman of the board of trustees
United World Federalists, Member, controller

John Cowles
Minneapolis Star and Tribune Co., President, chairman
Des Moines Register and Tribune Co., Chairman of the board
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Trustee

Charles H. Dyson
Dyson-Kissner Corporation, Chairman of the board
U.S. Treasury Department, Representative at Bretton Woods Conference

William Golden
Council on Foreign Relations, Member
New York City Rand Institute, Trustee
U.S. Radiator Co., and its successors, Chairman of the board
Mitre Corp., Trustee

Walter Haas
Levi Strauss & Co., President, chairman of the board

Andrew Heiskell
Time, Inc., Chairman of the board, chief executive officer
National Urban Coalition, Director, cochairman
Harvard Board of Overseers, President

William Hewlett
Hewlett-Packard Co., Cofounder, president, chief executive officer
Chase Manhattan Bank, Director
Utah International, Director
President's Scientific Advisory Committee, Member
Carnegie Institution, Trustee

Amory Houghton, Jr.
Corning Glass Works, Chairman, chief executive officer, director
First National City Bank, Director
Dow Corning Corporation, Director
IBM Corporation, Director
Harvard Board of Overseers

Jacob Merrill Kaplan
Welch Grape Juice Co., Organizer, president, owner
J. M. Kaplan Fund, Inc., President, trustee

Donald Klopfer
Random House, Inc., Chairman of the board, now emeritus

Philip M. Klutznick
Salomon Bros., Limited partner
Committee for Economic Development, Vice president and trustee
World Jewish Congress, President

Sol Linowitz
Xerox Corporation, Chairman of the board, chairman of the executive committee, general counsel
Time, Inc., Director
Pan American World Airways, Inc., Director
Commission on Critical Choices for Americans, Member
Council on Foreign Relations, Member
Trilateral Commission, Member

Stanley Marcus
Neiman-Marcus, President, chairman of the board, chairman of the executive committee
Council on Foreign Relations, Director
Committee for Economic Development, Board of directors
National Urban League, Trustee

Andre Meyer
Lazard Frères & Co., of New York, London, and Paris; Senior partner

J. Irwin Miller
Cummins Engine Co., President, chairman of the board
American Telephone & Telegraph Co., Director
World Council of Churches, Member of central and executive committees
National Council of Churches of Christ, U.S.A.; President
Ford Foundation, Trustee
Urban Institute, Trustee

Stewart Mott
Rubin Realty Co., New York City; Partner, director
Michigan National Bank of Flint, Corporate director
U.S. Sugar Corporation, Corporate director

Louise Ottinger
Mother of Representative Richard Ottinger, New York

William S. Paley
CBS, Chairman of the board
Commission on Critical Choices for Americans, Member
Council on Foreign Relations, Member

Jubal Parten
Woodley Can. Oil Co., President and general manager
Pan American Sulphur Co., Founder, president, chairman of the board
Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas, Director
Fund for the Republic, Inc.; Organizing director, chairman

Simon Ramo
TRW, Inc., Chairman of the executive committee, vice chairman of the board

Blanchette Hooker Rockefeller
Wife of John D., III
National Council on the Humanities, Member

David Rockefeller
Chase Manhattan Bank, Chairman of the board and chief executive officer
Council on Foreign Relations, Honorary chairman, chairman
Trilateral Commission, Founder

John D. Rockefeller III
Asia Society, Founder, president, chairman
General Education Board, Chairman
Population Council, Inc., Founder, chairman
Agricultural Development Council, Founder, chairman, president
United Negro College Fund, Chairman of national council

John D. Rockefeller IV
Governor of West Virginia

Laurance S. Rockefeller
Citizens Advisory Committee on Environmental Quality, Chairman

Laurance S. Rockefeller, Jr.
Son of Laurance S. and Mary F.

Mary C. Rockefeller
Married to Nelson Rockefeller, 1930 to 1962

Nelson A. Rockefeller
Vice president of the United States
Governor of New York
Assistant secretary of state for American Republics affairs
Commission on Critical Choices for Americans, Chairman
President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, Member

Sandra F. Rockefeller
Daughter of John D. III and Blanchette H.

Sharon Percy Rockefeller
Daughter of Sen. Charles Percy of Illinois
Wife of John D. IV

Steven Rockefeller
Son of Nelson and Mary C.

Mary Scranton
Wife of William Scranton, governor of Pennsylvania

Norton Simon
Norton Simon, Inc., Organizer and founder
Carnegie Commission on the Future of Higher Education, Member

Howard Stein
Dreyfus Fund, Chairman, president

Iphigene Ochs Sulzberger
Wife of Arthur Sulzberger, President and publisher, New York Times Co.

Thomas J. Watson, Jr.
IBM, Chairman of the executive committee, chairman of the board
Council on Foreign Relations, Member

John Hay Whitney
Ambassador to Great Britain
New York Herald-Tribune, President and publisher

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heard. Robert Sherrill, veteran Washington correspondent for *The Nation*, once noted that although Gardner "believes the corporate dollar corrupts politics, he also believes Common Cause is immune from such corruption."

Although the patronage of people like the Rockefellers raises suspicions about the purity of Common Cause, it requires a keen sense of nuance to figure out why such people are interested in the kind of issues Common Cause deals with. One might first note that the organization has steered carefully away from efforts to dismantle the existing machinery of the corporate state. But more significant are the numerous "reforms" in election laws and congressional rules it has advocated, changes that frequently are derided as merely "procedural" but in fact make the political process far more susceptible to manipulation by the wealthy. And in some matters, such as environmentalism, Common Cause has taken clear steps to protect the privileges of the upper classes.

Many of Common Cause's "reforms" have had the unambiguous effect of limiting participation in political contests. Take, for example, the 1974 Campaign Act, a comprehensive law ostensibly aimed at cleaning up political campaigns by such devices as limiting the amount of contributions and total campaign expenses, restricting the amount of one's own money a candidate may spend, and providing public funds to help finance Presidential races. Besides handicapping challengers—since they usually are less well-known than incumbents and thus have to spend more money to have any chance of winning—the public financing provision in effect perpetuates the two-party system forever. To receive federal funds, a third party must have gotten no less than five percent of the popular vote in the previous election and must be able to obtain a place on the ballot in at least ten states. That may not sound very difficult, but the requirement effectively crippled the 1976 campaign of Eugene McCarthy, even with his advantage of being a nationally known figure who had made a strong race for the Democratic nomination only eight years before. Forced to rely exclusively on private contributions while his major party opponents received federal subsidies —even in the primaries—McCarthy never had a chance.

One can hardly help suspecting that the obstacles to third-party candidates presented by the 1974 act were deliberate. When Common Cause was founded, the memory of George Wallace's 1968 campaign, which attracted 13 percent of the popular vote and 46 electoral votes, was still fresh in the minds of those wealthy individuals who had been providing financial support to the two major parties for decades. The specter of a strong third party, out of the ideological mainstream and owing nothing to them, must have been rather frightening. Quite possibly they saw public financing as a way of stifling any prospective third parties—an approach that could be cloaked in the guise of idealistic reform.

Third parties traditionally have been the refuge of America's ideologues, whose influence in today's major parties is diluted to the point of ineffectuality. When a political movement on either the left or the right can't gain control of one of the major parties, it may seek to create its own party. This was done on behalf of Eugene McCarthy and both George and Henry Wallace, as well as in the less publicized cases of the Libertarian party and a number of socialist parties.

By institutionalizing the two-party system in a federally subsidized program, Common Cause's campaign reforms almost inevitably restrict the voter's choice to the major parties, whose common views and interests far outweigh their superficial differences. The establishment consists of people who have made (or inherited) their fortunes under the existing rules; by definition, they are the group most likely to feel threatened by drastic political changes, since they have the most to lose. Thus it is in their interest to promote broad-based, consensus-seeking parties of relatively conservative views, and to hamper all ideological movements. "Extremists of the right and the left work with purposeful enthusiasm," wrote John Gardner in 1968, "to deepen our suspicion and fear of one another and to loosen the bonds that hold the society together. The trouble, of course, is that they may succeed in pulling the society apart." Or maybe the trouble is that they will compel their complacent fellow citizens to pay attention to matters the public had previously ignored.

The rich and established also have an interest in laws requiring disclosure of, and placing limits on, private contributions to political campaigns, paradoxical though it may seem at first glance. The pervasive influence of a family like the Rockefellers goes far beyond mere cash. Their financial holdings are so extensive, their economic power so unassailable, and their powerful allies so numerous that they have no need of crude measures like bribes, either in the form of money under the table or of campaign contributions. The Rockefellers, after all, can win friends simply by appointing them to corporate or foundation boards or by financing their study projects. David Rockefeller doesn't have to donate to a senator's reelection campaign to be assured of ready access to him; all he has to do is pick up the phone. The same can be said of most of the establishment pillars who contribute to Common Cause. If the supposedly corrupting influence of money is removed from politics, they will lose no influence.

The people likely to be hurt by such "reforms" are those citizens of relatively modest means whose interests—as small businessmen, labor union members, or whatever—are highly vulnerable to government policies, but whose stature is insufficient to guarantee a hearing from those in a position to protect them. Prevented from buying the attention of members of Congress, they may be left without any leverage at all over the policies of their government—which would leave the members of the upper crust with more influence than ever.

COMMON CAUSE'S CONGRESSIONAL REforms, touted as efforts to make Congress more democratic, have actually made it less so by fragmenting some power and centralizing the rest. The principal change in that direction has been the requirement that committee chairmen must be approved by a vote of the party caucus, instead of being chosen solely on the basis of seniority. This change brought an end to the fabled power of committee chairmen. The seniority system, one should keep in mind, was originally installed to limit the power of the Speaker of the House by protecting the independence of the committee chairmen, a reaction to the autocratic rule of Speaker Joe Cannon early in this century. By granting substantial power to chairmen who reflected a variety of sectional and ideological interests, the system frustrated manipulation of the House by nationally prominent interests. Such manipulation is easier when power is centralized in the Speaker. That has been the effect of this alteration in the seniority system: The Speaker

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has more power than he has had in decades, while committee chairmen have been emasculated.

Common Cause has also been the principal backer of the notorious lobby disclosure act. This bill, which has the distinction of being opposed by virtually every lobbying organization in Washington, would substantially increase the cost of such activities by adding burdensome new reporting requirements. It has been attacked by the American Civil Liberties Union as an abridgement of the First Amendment right to petition, and by other groups as a threat to their very existence. The lobby disclosure bill would almost surely curtail the activities of grass-roots lobbying organizations, but not the activities of Common Cause, which can easily afford to meet the new rules.

On one genuine grass-roots movement, the tax revolt, Common Cause has had little comment, but it opposes the campaign—recently endorsed by California Governor Jerry Brown—to call a constitutional convention to consider an amendment requiring a balanced federal budget except in cases of emergency—ostensibly because it doubts that such a convention could legally be limited to this one matter. One way to avoid a constitutional convention is for Congress to amend the Constitution on its own. Common Cause has not recommended this course, however. Gardner's views on taxation are more or less what one would expect of a former Great Society general. "We're going to have to increase taxes," he told Elizabeth Drew of the *New Yorker* in 1973. "Politicians don't like to talk about raising taxes, but it's as inevitable as tomorrow's dawn."

Its proposals lend themselves to ready use by the elite.

Another concern of Common Cause that appeals particularly to its upper-middle-class constituency is environmentalism. As William Tucker has shown, this is often merely a guise in which local aristocrats mobilize to prevent changes they find distasteful or indecorous. Since the choice to be made is frequently between economic growth and development on the one hand and scenic beauty on the other, environmentalism tends to be indulged in only by those who have already made it. Few issues divide Americans along clearer class lines. A study by a California commission found that most campers were distinctly upper middle class—and that their enjoyment of nature was being subsidized by those taxpayers farther down the income scale. Last year's Democratic primary in Minnesota provided a dramatic illustration of the anger that can be aroused among rural citizens against urban romantics who want to replace powerboats and snowmobiles with canoes and cross-country skis.

A notable ploy of Laurance Rockefeller deserves special mention for its audacity. His tactic was to buy a large estate in a remote area (St. John in the Virgin Islands), build a plush retreat for the rich, get tax-exempt status for the actual site, and then donate the surrounding land to the government to serve as a park. Laurance gets a nice tax break, and the people who frequent his resort get protection from the intrusion of real estate developers and ill-bred neighbors. The taxpayers, meantime, get to pay for maintaining the park, keeping it up to the standards of its wealthy neighbors.

The point of these examples is to indicate that the platitudes of environmentalism are often a facade, a well-manicured effort to protect politically the privileged position of people who have the time and money to enjoy nature at their leisure. Often they involve shutting out people of lower station—who then help foot the bill. One should note that Common Cause's environmentalist efforts represent one of its few ventures outside the realm of "procedural" reform. No doubt the organization and its supporters regard this issue as critically important.

IN LOOKING AT COMMON CAUSE'S OVERALL record, one should not make the mistake of regarding the organization as a tool of the superrich. Its real constituency is not the handful of wealthy establishment figures who make large donations, but the mostly white, upper-middle-class citizens who make up the bulk of its membership. Common Cause's reforms tend to serve their interests even more clearly than those of the superrich. One reason these people show so much concern about weakening the hold of "special interests" on the government is that they are not members of any special interest groups. Common Cause no doubt counts among its members very few farmers, labor union members, blacks, or even executives of steel firms or shoe manufacturers. Some may be doctors and lawyers, two interest groups whose influence on the government, like that of the Rockefellers, is so longstanding and pervasive as to lie beyond the reach of any changes in lobbying regulations or campaign laws. But many are simply well-to-do white-collar workers who have no organized interest group to lobby on their behalf, and who thus have every reason to want to dilute the strength of "special interests" whose aims clash with their own.

Neither should one discount the persistence of humanitarian instincts in this group. Unquestionably most of the people who join Common Cause sincerely believe they are helping to improve the lives of all of us, and in some respects they may be right. Goals like "opening up the system" and "making Congress accountable" have a definite, if rather ill-defined, appeal to that peculiar American sense of right and wrong. In any event, supporting such causes helps to salve the conscience of the well-to-do liberal without actually presenting a danger to his obvious economic interest: namely, maintaining an upper-middle-class station. More drastic steps to solve social and economic problems might similarly relieve guilt, but unfortunately they would also threaten the position of those who thrive on the status quo.

To understand why Common Cause pursues the policies it does, it is essential to keep in mind that, like any successful organization, this one follows certain rules of bureaucratic self-interest. By concentrating on a few innocuous-sounding legislative and environmental matters, Common Cause has welded together a large and powerful constituency—a large chunk of affluent white America. Whatever else one can say about it, Common Cause's shrewd approach has earned it the right to speak for that group of Americans. That is why Common Cause has accomplished as much as it has, why it commands so much respect in Washington, and why it means so much to those whose interests it represents.

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A new Watergate revelation:

THE WHITE HOUSE DEATH SQUAD

BY JONATHAN MARSHALL

MUGGING SQUADS, KIDnapping, sabotage, the use of prostitutes for political blackmail, break-ins to obtain and photograph documents, and various forms of electronic surveillance and wiretapping. These were some of the elements of G. Gordon Liddy's million-dollar plan—described by Jeb Magruder—to win the 1972 presidential election for Richard Nixon, as he presented it to John Mitchell. "It's not quite what I had in mind," said the attorney general, as he sent Liddy back to the drawing board to come up with something less ambitious and costly.

What Mitchell may not have realized —and what Nixon may have meant when he said, "did Mitchell know about this?"—was that Liddy and his coconspirator E. Howard Hunt had already begun to implement an even more sensitive and dangerous operation: the recruitment of a secret army of Cuban exiles, answerable only to the White House, and equipped to assassinate foreign leaders.

On August 15, 1973, President Nixon told a press conference that upon learning of a Justice Department investigation of the "plumbers' squad" burglary of the office of Daniel Ellsberg's psychiatrist, he became "gravely concerned that other activities of the Special Investigative Unit might be disclosed, because I knew this could seriously injure the national security." Nixon never identified these "other activities," and at the time his words seemed to be no more than a lame justification for his cover-up of Watergate. But a new investigation of this clandestine White House unit reveals that Nixon may have had a much bigger cover-up in mind: Specifically, had the arrests at Watergate not disrupted their plans, Hunt and Liddy were prepared to carry out at least one assassination plot — against Panamanian leader Omar Torrijos.

> "Of course this Hunt, that will uncover a lot of things. You open that scab there's a hell of a lot of things and we just feel that it would be very detrimental to have this thing go any further. This involves these Cubans, Hunt, and a lot of hanky-panky that we have nothing to do with ourselves. Well what the hell, did Mitchell know about this?"--President Nixon, White House conversation, June 23, 1972.

The plot against Torrijos was a product of the twin preoccupations with political enemies and drugs that were the hallmark of Nixon's Special Investigations Unit. Formed in mid-1971, when John Ehrlichman ordered his aide Egil Krogh to probe the leaking of the Pentagon papers, the unit operated out of Room 16 of the Executive Office Building. There Gordon Liddy and Walter Minnick helped Krogh coordinate the administration's "war on drugs," a struggle that Nixon described in his message to Congress of June 17, 1971, as nothing less than "a national emergency." It was this "war on drugs" that provided the Plumbers with their ostensible rationale for the conspiracy against Torrijos: The White House suspected the Panamian leader of aiding and abetting known narcotics traffickers. But the plot against Torrijos was more than just law enforcement gone wild. Like so many of the other secret operations of the Nixon White House, it was an effort to destroy a political enemy who dared to challenge the White House's definition of the national interest.

Nixon's Drug War

*THE NIXON ADMINISTRA*tion's suspicion that leading Panamanian officials were involved in the drug traffic was by no means unjustified. By 1970–1971, the Customs Bureau and the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs (BNDD) were busy smashing the enormously successful Corsican–Latin American drug networks of Auguste Ricord. With Ricord and many of his associates arrested or on the run, BNDD and Customs began focusing on Panama as a key transshipment point for Latin American narcotics destined for the U.S. market.

On February 6, 1971, American police arrested Joaquin Him Gonzales, chief of air traffic control at Panama's international airport, in the Canal Zone. They had lured him onto American-controlled territory to watch a softball game; after the arrest he was flown in a military plane to Texas, where a sealed indictment awaited him. The Panamanian government expressed outrage at the kidnapping of an important government official; the Department of State deplored the straining of relations with Panama. Joaquin Him got five years for the

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narcotics charge.

Six months later, Rafael Richard, Jr., son of Panama's ambassador to Taiwan, was arrested in New York with 154 pounds of heroin. Richard carried a diplomatic passport and tried unsuccessfully to claim immunity. U.S. officials noted with interest that Panama's Foreign Minister Juan Tack had signed the passport and that Moises Torrijos, brother of the Panamanian strongman, had helped obtain it for young Rafael.

On the basis of this arrest and other intelligence reports, BNDD and Customs officials now suspected that the Panamanian government had been corrupted at its highest levels. As Jack Anderson confirmed on March 14, 1972, and Drug Abuse, "the entire heroin refining operation can be thrown into chaos." Krogh himself admitted that assassinations took place in Southeast Asia, and John Dean, in a recent interview, revealed that Krogh once asked him to help resolve a dispute between the BNDD, the Pentagon, and the State Department over the legality of kidnapping drug traffickers in Latin America.

On January 10, 1972, undoubtedly in response to White House pressure for more action on the narcotics front, Ingersoll asked his staff to consider the possible "immobilization and/or neutralization" of Colonel Manuel Noriega, chief of intelligence for Panama's Guardia Nacional, whom the BNDD

Nixon urged that $100 million be spent on a secret program to kidnap and wipe out narcotics traffickers.

"American narcotics agents have implicated the foreign minister of Panama and the brother of Panamanian dictator Omar Torrijos in a scheme to smuggle hundreds of pounds of heroin into the United States." Sometime in the spring of 1972, according to recently obtained Justice Department documents, a federal grand jury handed down a sealed indictment against Moises Torrijos. As long as Panamanian officials stayed off U.S. soil, however, there was little the administration could do through normal legal channels.

But then, the administration had never committed itself to working solely through normal legal channels. In May 1971, the White House asked John Ingersoll, director of the BNDD, to draft a plan for "clandestine law enforcement" in the drug field—including assassination. By May 27, 1971, Nixon, John Ehrlichman, and Egil Krogh had agreed to secretly budget $100 million for a covert BNDD kidnap and assassination program. "This decisive action," read the minutes of the meeting, "is our only hope for destroying or immobilizing the highest level of drug traffickers." BNDD officials began talking openly of the need to establish "hit squads": With only "150 key assassinations," several BNDD officials told Dr. J. Thomas Ungerleider of the National Commission on Marijuana suspected of involvement in the heroin trade. According to a still-secret report of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, the options outlined in the five-page report included:

> Linking the official [Noriega] to a fictitious plot against General Torrijos . . . , leaking information on drug trafficking to the press; linking his removal to the Panama Canal negotiations; secretly encouraging powerful groups within Panama to raise the issue; and 'total and complete immobilization.'

It has also been alleged that two leading BNDD officials, Phillip Smith and William Durkin, took part in discussions of whether to assassinate Omar Torrijos. These allegations are contained in a secret 1975 Justice Department report—known as the DeFeo report, after one of its coauthors—that outlined to the attorney general "allegations of fraud, irregularity, and misconduct in the Drug Enforcement Administration," the agency that succeeded the BNDD. (The Justice Department, by the order of Attorney General Edward Levi, closely guarded the contents of this report. Even the Senate Intelligence Committee, although granted access to the report, was not given a copy.) According to the DeFeo report, Smith denied any such plotting, but claimed instead that he passed on to the CIA information he had received about a conspiracy to kill the Panamanian general. However, the DeFeo report also mentions charges—corroborated by the existence of the Ingersoll option paper—that "a discussion concerning assassinations involved the possibility of killing Mr. Noryago [*sic*], the principal assistant to the President of Panama, and that Smith and William Durkin actually proposed that he be killed." (Durkin, then chief of criminal enforcement, retired from the DEA in December 1978. Smith, now head of security for the Resorts International casino in Atlantic City, was chief of special projects.)

A follow-up Justice Department report found "no evidence that any overt acts occurred which could be characterized as criminal violations of law." In other words, Noriega is still alive. However, as the Senate report states without further elaboration, "some" of the options presented to Ingersoll "were put into action." Thus, the BNDD waged a successful campaign of press leaks, through Jack Anderson and the anti-Torrijos press in Latin America, to encourage Torrijos's opponents and to shame the regime into cracking down on official corruption. The BNDD was probably behind the detailed and informed charges printed in *La Hora* in Panama on January 29, 1972, accusing Omar Torrijos of protecting the drug "mafia." Before Torrijos could shut down the presses, several thousand copies of the newspaper had been circulated. And four days after the arrests at Watergate, Ingersoll visited Panama to warn Torrijos, according to transcripts of their meeting, that "narcotics enforcement is in your government's best interest. Failure to do so effectively could result in further embarrassment to your government." The chastened general in turn "promised full cooperation with BNDD" in "stopping the traffic."

The Torrijos Plot

WHILE THE WHITE House pressured the BNDD to use any means to eliminate Panama's drug traffickers, it was secretly mounting its own deadly campaign against General Torrijos. The top operators in this theater of the "war on drugs" were Gordon Liddy and E. Howard Hunt.

Liddy, a former district attorney from New York, had joined the Nixon administration in 1969 as special assistant to the secretary of the treasury,

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with responsibility for law enforcement functions of the Customs Bureau, the Internal Revenue Service, and the Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms Bureau. In that capacity, he organized in 1969 the notorious "Operation Intercept," a disruption of traffic at the southern border that bludgeoned the Mexican government into accepting U.S. demands for greater participation in the narcotics "war." Liddy lost his job at the Treasury Department for making an unauthorized speech against gun control, but he soon went to work for Egil Krogh in the White House. There he began recommending formation of a White House–controlled drug enforcement unit to free Nixon from the bureaucratic resistance of entrenched agencies in the Justice and Treasury departments.

E. Howard Hunt, a retired career CIA agent then working for the Mullen Agency, a CIA-connected PR firm, went to work for the White House on July 7, 1971, as a $100-a-day consultant. Hunt was known around the White House as an adviser on the Far East narcotics traffic, but secretly he began working with Liddy on clandestine political operations. His fees—and other expenses of the Special Investigations Unit (SIU)—were paid out of a secret $1.5 million White House Special Projects Fund.

Hunt was in a particularly good position to recruit loyal agents to carry out White House orders. As the CIA's political chief for the Bay of Pigs invasion, Hunt was on intimate terms with literally hundreds of anti-Castro Cuban exiles whose personal loyalties to Hunt, conservative politics, and clandestine skills would make them ideal SIU operatives.

Hunt visited Miami in the summer of 1971 to contact his old CIA friend Bernard Barker. Barker, who revered his former boss, had been the CIA's paymaster to the various exile groups. He had also served the agency as a secret informant during the 1950s, while a member of Batista's secret police, and later he helped establish the Nicaraguan and Guatemalan bases from which the exiles launched their invasion of Cuba.

Hunt had already sought out and met Barker that spring at a reunion of Bay of Pigs veterans in Miami. Now he asked Barker to join a new "national security organization . . . above both the CIA and FBI." The ever-loyal Barker jumped at the chance. Hunt gave Barker the task of recruiting CIA-trained anti-Castro exiles to be put at the disposal of the White House. Barker ultimately put together a secret army of 120 Cuban exiles; as he later described it, they were trained in every conceivable clandestine skill, including killing. One of their targets, it is now clear, was White House enemy Omar Torrijos.

The White House directed its huge army of Cuban exiles to "hit the mafia using the tactics of the mafia."

THERE HAVE BEEN SUGGESTIVE accounts of the White House campaign against Torrijos, but the full story has never been pulled together. On June 18, 1973, *Newsweek* offered an informed glimpse of those plots, and predicted John Dean would reveal their existence in his forthcoming Watergate testimony. "Dean's story is that the Administration suspected high Panamanian officials of being involved in the flow of heroin from Latin America into the U.S., and were also concerned about strongman Omar Torrijos's uncooperative attitude toward renegotiating the Panama Canal treaty," wrote *Newsweek*. "Thus, in Dean's telling, some officials found a Torrijos hit doubly attractive. The contract, he said, went to E. Howard Hunt, later a ringleader in the Watergate break-in; Hunt, according to Dean, had his team in Mexico before the mission was aborted." When his turn came to testify in public, Dean did not mention Panama, and in a recent interview he denied ever learning of Hunt's plans. The *Newsweek* reporter responsible for the story, however, while now admitting that his sources erred in assuming Dean's knowledge, insists that those sources accurately described the plot on the basis of first-hand knowledge.

Corroboration for the story has come from the participants themselves. Sometime after July 1971, Hunt approached Manuel Artime, who had headed the Bay of Pigs Cuban invasion force under Hunt's direction. In 1963 and 1964, Artime participated at a high level in CIA plots—said to include both Hunt and Barker—to kill Castro and invade Cuba anew. Artime remained a close friend both of Hunt (becoming godfather to one of Hunt's children) and of Barker (who smuggled Artime out of Cuba after Castro's takeover). Artime, in secret testimony before the Watergate grand jury in 1973, revealed that Hunt had asked him to join in disrupting the Panamanian narcotics traffic, saying "something had to be taken care of" in the Central American country. That mission, scheduled to take place after the election, was obviously aborted by Watergate, but not before Hunt introduced Artime to "a friend of the White House" named G. Gordon Liddy.

Artime, questioned by the grand jury for four hours about the Panama assassination project, denied having joined Hunt or recruiting other Cubans. But on November 3, 1974, former Cuban exile leader Carlos Rivero Collado, son of a former Cuban president, told a press conference: "Artime, approximately two years ago, was plotting to assassinate the chief of the Panamanian state, General Omar Torrijos. Artime had active, direct participation in the Watergate affair; however, his name has never been mentioned." (Artime was publicly identified only as a backer of the Miami Watergate Defendants' Fund.)

Whether or not Artime did join Hunt, Barker had no difficulty in recruiting a large number of other Cubans. Barker admits that the White House envisioned using his secret army in an all-out drug war: in Barker's words, "to hit the Mafia using the tactics of the Mafia."

Gordon Liddy must have relished the thought of commanding his Cuban troops. "He was a nut about guns and silencers and combat daggers and so on," recalls anti-Castro activist and Watergate burglar Frank Sturgis, "and he was always talking about 'disposal'—about killing people."

Nor was Hunt a stranger to such tactics. In his book on the Bay of Pigs invasion, *Give Us This Day*, Hunt tells of urging his superior in the clandestine division of the CIA to assassinate Castro "before or coincident with the invasion." All the CIA's Castro plots failed,

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of course, but Hunt's fellow Plumber Frank Sturgis claims, "Howard was in charge of a couple of other CIA operations that involved 'disposal,' and I can tell you, some of them worked."

Sturgis admitted, after his arrest for the Watergate burglary, that he had joined Hunt in an "investigation" of the drug traffic from Mexico, Paraguay, and Panama. Sturgis was an old hand at clandestine activity. He claims to have worked variously for Israeli intelligence, Castro's air force, the U.S. Army Security Agency, and the CIA, devoting himself since 1959 to the overthrow of Communism in Cuba. In 1961, he joined Operation 40, a secret political and intelligence team charged by the CIA with forming a new government in Cuba following Castro's overthrow. Howard Hunt and Manuel Artime had used this "Cuban CIA" to purge the Bay of Pigs exile force of most of its liberal, anti-Batista elements. One branch of Operation 40 consisted of an elite murder squad, made up primarily of experienced killers from Batista's secret police. Several years ago Sturgis told an interviewer, "the assassination section, which I was a part of . . . would, upon orders naturally, assassinate either members of the military in the foreign country, members of the political parties of the foreign country that you were going to infiltrate, and if necessary some of your own members, who were suspected of being foreign agents." Sturgis says he took part in several pre-Operation 40 attempts against the life of Castro in 1959 and 1960, and claims to have engaged in subsequent plots in Central America.

When Frank Sturgis was caught inside the Democratic National Committee headquarters in the Watergate building, he was carrying a Mexican visa made out in the name of Edward J. Hamilton. That name, it soon became clear, was E. Howard Hunt's old CIA alias; indeed the whole Watergate team carried phony identifications prepared by the CIA. Hunt had obtained the Mexican tourist card on January 7, 1972, valid for three months. Rumors began to circulate in Washington that the visa was obtained in connection with a task force Hunt had sent into Mexico for a "national security" operation against Torrijos.

Sturgis has been extremely reticent in recent years about his Watergate operations with Hunt and Liddy, telling interviewers only, "There are some things that I could never discuss." But shortly after the Watergate break-in he talked with Andrew St. George, an old friend of his, about the Panama plots. Sturgis apparently believed "the fix was in" on the Watergate job and that the Cubans would be released to continue on some of their other sensitive projects. "The White House has decided that dead or alive, Torrijos must go," St. George recalls Sturgis saying. "We must use terror."

Hunt says, "I think the feeling was that if Torrijos didn't shape up and cooperate he was going to be wasted."

Fortunately, we now have public confirmation of the plot from E. Howard Hunt himself. Shortly after Hunt was released from prison in February 1977, he was interviewed by a Boston television station. Asked whether he knew "anything about a project to eliminate Panama dictator Torrijos," Hunt for the first—and last—time made a startling admission. "Panama," he said, citing CIA reports, "was a drug trafficking area where drugs could move easily . . . with the blessing of the Panamanian government. There was a great deal of concern on the part of the drug officials and certainly on the part of some of the Latin American drug informants. *I think the feeling was that if Torrijos didn't shape up and cooperate he was going to be wasted.* That never happened. I don't know any of the people asked to participate other than the people in the Plumbers unit. They had that as part of their brief."

The Politics of Murder

WHY WAS THE WHITE House so anxious to "waste" the Panamanian dictator? After all, many other U.S. allies, particularly in Southeast Asia, also condoned narcotics trafficking, yet as far as we know, no one talked of bumping off French President Georges Pompidou just because his intelligence service was implicated in the "French Connection." For all the rhetoric about a "national emergency," the Nixon administration's "war on drugs" was as much an expedient political campaign as it was a sincerely held conviction. Why in any case did his agents not consider a less drastic fate for Torrijos?

Revulsion toward narcotics traffic can hardly explain the enthusiasm of Hunt's friends for the planned "hit," since most of them tolerated or even worked with organized crime when confronted by what they saw as the infinitely greater evil of Castro. CIA Director Richard Helms, for example, told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in executive session that the CIA had released Bernard Barker from service in the mid-1960s because of his association with "gambling and criminal elements."

An FBI memo on Frank Sturgis prepared only two days after the Watergate arrests cited Miami sources who said "he is now associated with organized crime activities . . ." Sturgis's International Anti-Communist Brigade, active back in the early 1960s, was described by the attorney for one of its other leaders as being "financed by dispossessed hotel and gambling owners who operated under Batista." Many of these same interests, of course, had a stake in the pre-Castro Cuban heroin and cocaine traffic. We know also that Operation 40, of which Sturgis was a member, remained active as a CIA counterintelligence operation until 1970, when federal narcotics authorities arrested several of its leading members on charges of having masterminded the nation's largest heroin and cocaine ring.

Finally, we have the example of Manuel Artime, the "golden boy of the CIA," who received millions of dollars from the CIA to mount a second invasion of Cuba from Costa Rica in 1964—only to have a *Miami Herald* reporter poke around and discover that "a government cloak of secrecy over Cuban exile training was being used as a cover for smuggling."

Moreover, other known targets of the Room 16 team had always been *political* enemies of the White House. The Plumbers had originally organized under Egil Krogh to gather information to blackmail Daniel Ellsberg, whom the White House suspected of

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knowing about its plans for escalating the war. When that mission failed, President Nixon the next spring ordered Ellsberg silenced by other means. On May 3, shortly before the mining of Haiphong harbor, J. Edgar Hoover's body lay in state in the Rotunda of the Capitol, and Ellsberg was expected to attend an unrelated antiwar demonstration outside. Once again Hunt called on Barker, who recruited a squad of 10 activists, including Frank Sturgis and Felipe de Diego (both formerly of the CIA's Operation 40); Angel Ferrer, head of Cubanos de Fort Jackson (an army commando training center); and Humberto Lopez, a leader of the violent National Front for the Liberation of Cuba. Their orders were to pose as patriotic Americans outraged at the lack of respect shown to Hoover by the demonstration and to beat up Ellsberg. Although the Cubans were unable to get to Ellsberg, the scheme was remarkable as possibly the only time that an American President has ordered his goons to batter a U.S. citizen.

By the spring of 1972 Jack Anderson had become a White House enemy on a par with Ellsberg, because of his relentless coverage of the ITT scandal. Nixon repeatedly asked Charles Colson to discredit or quiet the columnist. On March 14, Colson met with Hunt, who recalls the White House counsel asking him to look into ways of drugging Anderson. Ten days later, Hunt and Liddy met with a former CIA physician in an unsuccessful attempt to obtain hallucinatory drugs. Hunt has since denied published reports that he sought to kill Anderson, but his admitted plan to coat the steering wheel of Anderson's car with a mind-altering drug "for absorption through the palms of the hands" surely amounts to the same thing. It is hardly reassuring that Colson has testified that Hunt *also* met with CIA doctors "in connection with consideration of covert action against Daniel Ellsberg."

Given this pattern to the Plumbers' activities, the White House plot against Torrijos—and the enthusiasm with which anti-Castro activists joined in—must be understood at least in part as a political operation, rather than simply an example of drug enforcement gone wild. The origins of the conspiracy probably have more to do with Torrijos's public image as a radical nationalist, friend of Cuba, and challenger of traditional American "rights" to the Canal Zone, than with his condoning of drug trafficking. It is significant that Hunt and Liddy were both extreme conservatives, close to right-wing interests represented in the Nixon administration by Hunt's White House supervisor Charles Colson. Hunt's Cuban exile friends in particular were becoming alarmed by Torrijos's friendship with Castro.

Hunt and Liddy asked a CIA doctor for hallucinatory drugs in order to disable or kill Jack Anderson.

AS EARLY AS 1969, COLUMNists Drew Pearson and Jack Anderson charged that Omar Torrijos belonged to the Communist party in Panama and that his brother Moises "was sent to Moscow all expenses paid by the Communists." In April 1971, Panamanian and U.S. businessmen complained that Torrijos was installing radical leftists in key cabinet positions and at the University of Panama. Such charges unified conservative forces when, on June 29, 1971, negotiations to transfer sovereignty over the Panama Canal resumed between the United States and Panama, following Torrijos's rejection of an agreement proposed earlier. By late 1971 the *Baltimore Sun* could report, "The United States reportedly is ready to accede sovereignty over the zone to the Panamanian government."

Expectations of a "sellout" mobilized opponents of the treaty. Congressman Daniel Flood (D-Pa.), who has come under federal investigation for wielding influence on behalf of Haiti's dictator Jean-Claude "Baby Doc" Duvalier—among other things—thundered, "The very moment we surrender sovereignty over the Zone to Panama as presently planned, Soviet power will take over the Republic of Panama as it did Cuba."

On November 15, 1971, Jack Anderson first disclosed Representative John Murphy's (D-N.Y.) plans to have his Panama Canal subcommittee of the Merchant Marine and Fisheries Committee hold hearings to determine whether the State Department was, in Anderson's words, "selling out U.S. interests in the Panama canal." Less than two weeks later, Anderson published the first of many "leaks" from that subcommittee; he described a briefing by BNDD director John Ingersoll, who held Panama responsible for one-twelfth of all the cocaine and heroin imported into the United States.

Murphy was not just another conservative hoping to dump the treaty: He also happened to be an old friend of Nicaraguan President Anastasio Somoza. In 1977, Murphy came under investigation by the official corruption unit of the U.S. attorney for the southern district of New York, for influence peddling on behalf of the Nicaraguan dictator.

Somoza also had the gratitude of E. Howard Hunt and his Cubans. As Central America's leading foe of communism, Somoza has from the time of the Bay of Pigs invasion encouraged Cuban exile forces to use his country as a launching platform for militant anti-Castro operations throughout Central and South America. Indeed, in September 1976, Somoza personally attended a reunion of the original Bay of Pigs force, Brigade 2506, and promised his continued support.

Somoza had his own compelling reasons to hope for a collapse of the talks with Panama, aside from his ideological interest in frustrating good relations between the populist Panama regime and the United States. In the 1971/72 period Somoza began negotiating with a consortium of billionaire financiers—Howard Hughes (then resident in Nicaragua), Daniel Ludwig, and the Rothschilds—to build a sea-level canal through Nicaragua to take traffic away from the outdated and politically unstable lock canal in Panama. It is surely significant, therefore, that Howard Hunt—according to Artime, who was interviewed by the FBI in June 1972—"expressed his interest in a proposed canal through Nicaragua. . . ." Hunt says he discussed Nicaraguan business deals at an April 1971 Bay of Pigs reunion with Barker and Artime (who was in the meat business with Somoza); FBI records indicate that he did so again with Artime, a year later, by telephone from the

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White House.

At the same time, however, plans were underway to build a similar, and cheaper, sea-level canal through Panama itself. The Atlantic-Pacific Interoceanic Canal Study Commission, appointed by President Johnson, reported in 1970 that such a canal was feasible and would probably be needed before the end of the century. Several members of the United States treaty-negotiating team from that era have admitted in recent interviews that the Nixon administration's pursuit of a new treaty was motivated in large part by the hope of winning permission from the Panamanian government for future construction of such a canal.

Congressman Murphy may have had Somoza's interests in mind, therefore, when, over the vigorous objections of the State Department, he used the canal hearings as a platform from which to torpedo the treaty negotiations. As an essential part of that strategy, he seized upon the emotional issue of drugs, airing reports from Customs and BNDD implicating the Panamanian leadership in the narcotics traffic.

Jack Anderson, Murphy's favored media contact, once again was the first to leak the committee's findings, in his March 14, 1972, column that fingered Juan Tack and Moises Torrijos. Murphy followed up the next day with a speech in Congress, accusing the "highest levels" of the Torrijos regime of complicity in the traffic. Murphy also attacked the State Department for turning a blind eye to the drug traffic in its unseemly haste to sign a treaty with Torrijos. (A few months later Jack Anderson reported yet another leak from the Murphy committee, in a column that began: "For the sake of better relations with Panama, the United States has gone soft on Panamanian heroin smugglers.")

Murphy's subcommittee report questioned whether "the United States is negotiating a treaty that involves a 70-year, five-billion-dollar U.S. commitment, not to mention the security of the United States and this hemisphere, with a government that condones or is actually involved in a drug-running operation into the United States." The report concluded unequivocally: "Because of the known involvement of Panamanian government officials in the international narcotics traffic, the U.S. government should take a firm stand in the current negotiations of a new treaty for the continued use of the Panama Canal Zone."

The State Department replied lamely that the Murphy report was "inappropriate." Privately, a member of the treaty negotiating team told Murphy that after weeks of agonizing the State Department had decided that "if it eliminated dialogue with all Latin American governments that might have officials involved in the narcotics traffic, very little dialogue would take place at all." But the anti-treaty forces rallied behind Murphy. Representative Flood rose to denounce "the collaboration of Panama with Cuba and the USSR" and suggested that in narcotics "our agents have uncovered the source of revenue for financing Soviet espionage."

"Pro-Red nationalist" countries, as Flood called them, hardly bore a unique responsibility for the drug traffic. BNDD director John Ingersoll himself admitted before the Murphy committee that "Most of what can be said of the situation [in Panama] is applicable to a number of other Central and South American urban transportation and communication centers as well as key cities in the Caribbean." Indeed, a secret 1972 CIA report on Latin American narcotics cited Murphy's beloved Nicaragua as a "transit point for heroin shipped north from South America via Panama to the United States." It identified Cuban exiles as the middle men for narcotics originating in such anticommunist lands as Argentina, Uruguay, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands. In short, the left-wing narcotics conspiracy made good propaganda but was not the primary concern of right-wing critics of Panama.

Murphy damned the administration for ignoring Panama's drug traffic in its haste to sign a new treaty.

SIGNIFICANTLY, HOWEVER, those propaganda charges were echoed by prominent Panamanian exile Arnulfo Arias, whose own dictatorial ambitions rivaled those of General Torrijos. Arias had served as president of Panama for only 11 days when Torrijos overthrew him in 1968. His chief spokesman (and a relative by marriage) was the ardent antitreaty lobbyist Philip Harman, who dedicated himself to ousting Torrijos and to returning Arias to power. In a letter to C. L. Sulzberger of the *New York Times* on April 21, 1972 (placed in the Congressional Record by the ever-helpful Daniel Flood), Harman warned of KGB infiltration in Panama, recited familiar charges against Juan Tack and the Torrijos brothers, and added, "I do know that President Arnulfo Arias, a former physician and now in exile in Miami, is gravely worried over this mounting heroin problem in his country in which 12% of the heroin in the United States stem from Panama." [*sic*]

Arias's oft-expressed outrage at corruption in the Torrijos regime wears thin, however, when his own record is recalled. During an earlier stretch as president of Panama, from 1949 to 1951, Arnulfo and his favorite nephew Antonio "The Druggist" Arias, in collaboration with the secret police, masterminded a huge narcotics and gold smuggling ring that accounted for much of the $2 million that President Arias is said to have made during his 20 months in office. Arias was also accused by opposition leaders—whom he promptly threw in jail—of profiting from illegal business deals with the Somoza family in Nicaragua. And he thought nothing of spending state funds for his own private ventures.

New evidence has come to light that Arias, possibly as just a figurehead, was involved with the White House in efforts to oust Torrijos in 1972. According to a source close to Frank Sturgis, the Room 16 group coordinated its assassination plot with a group of Panamanian exile leaders, including Arnulfo Arias and Colonel Amado Sanjur, who fled Panama in 1970 following an unsuccessful (and, many say, CIA-backed) coup attempt against Torrijos.

A confidential FBI report on "Panamanian Revolutionary Activities," dated September 18, 1972, throws light on this subject. It consists of a lengthy interview with Arias, who made no secret of his hope that Torri-

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jos would be "overthrown . . . by a force supported by the United States Government." Arias, the report continued, could not understand "why Torrijos, a dedicated leftist, is allowed to remain in power. If he is allowed to remain, he will be another Fidel Castro, whom he has visited in Cuba already."

Arias denied being "currently" engaged in organizing a force to overthrow Torrijos, but admitted—probably in reference to Barker's "secret army"—that he had "had help offered him from a group of Cubans in Miami." In the meantime, Arias said, he was "encouraging his associates in Panama to do all they can to work against the Torrijos regime."

But the Panamanian exiles persisted, even after Watergate. Representative Murphy early in 1974 disclosed the existence of "not one but two plots currently underway to overthrow the current military dictatorship. One plot involves a military overthrow of General Omar Torrijos—similar to the unsuccessful one that was attempted several years ago [i.e. the December 1969 Sanjur plot]—and the other involves a conspiracy of Panamanian businessmen—who are wooing ex-Panamanian military men in exile—because they are disenchanted with the current economic situation in Panama." Torrijos, he said, was negotiating with Arias in the hope of preventing a coup, but, Murphy concluded, "We simply do not wish to give this vital world waterway over to an unstable government that, aside from dabbling in the narcotics traffic, might be overthrown tomorrow."

The confluence of antitreaty lobbyists, Panamanian exiles, Somoza cronies, and Cuban exiles in plotting the ouster of Torrijos, and their common resort to narcotics charges to undermine State Department negotiations with his regime, all suggest the political motives that lay behind the Plumbers' plan to assassinate Torrijos. The same political instincts that led the White House warriors of Room 16 to suspect Daniel Ellsberg of ties to the Soviets or George McGovern of taking payoffs from Cuba inspired their violent ambitions against General Torrijos. But narcotics meanwhile provided a perfect excuse for the job, for had the Nixon administration not elevated the drive against narcotics to the moral equivalent of war? Assassinations might be immoral in peacetime, but not in war.

Watergate probably saved Panama's leader from death at the hands of the President's hired assassins.

MUCH ABOUT THE TORRIjos plot remains unclear, however. The Watergate special prosecutor's investigation did not resolve any of the remaining questions, according to the attorney who worked on the case, because the conspiracy was "too far afield." "It involved something outside of the United States," he said. "You just don't go after someone for that." But evidence such as the Mexican visa found on Sturgis at the time of the Watergate break-in tends to confirm *Newsweek*'s claim that Hunt actually sent a team into Mexico in connection with the intended assassination. How far the plot had progressed by the time of Watergate, however, remains uncertain.

A wall of silence surrounds the operation at its higher levels. Egil Krogh, Gordon Liddy, and E. Howard Hunt will not talk, and the locus of responsibility within the White House cannot, therefore, be pinned down. It is hard to believe that Hunt would have gone ahead with a plot to kill a foreign leader without higher authorization, although in light of Liddy's propensity to take off-the-cuff remarks as orders, authorization might not have been explicit. If Nixon did approve the operation—and evidence from other Watergate operations suggests that he must have known of it—the question of his motives remains.

Nixon might have sanctioned the elimination of Torrijos simply as part of his "war on drugs." But why Torrijos and not any number of other leaders in Latin America or Southeast Asia? *Le Monde* charged that the destruction of Ricord's Corsican drug network in Latin America—of which the BNDD's Panama campaign was a part—was a result of "close Mafia-police–Narcotics Bureau collaboration," with "proofs furnished obligingly by La Cosa Nostra." According to this bizarre but not impossible theory, it was no mistake that Cuban-Italian organizations, often with ties to the CIA, replaced the old Corsican syndicates.

A more likely theory centers on the fact—confirmed in recent interviews with former senior officials of the State Department and treaty negotiators—that by the spring of 1972 the White House realized that its treaty demands for a 50-year military presence in the Canal Zone and for construction rights to a sea-level canal were encountering serious opposition from the Torrijos government. Indeed, later that year, the general rejected the final, firm U.S. offer. Nixon may well have believed that conservative, Miami-based Panamanian exiles such as Arnulfo Arias and Amado Sanjur would be more sympathetic to U.S. interests and might accept a treaty where Torrijos would not.

Finally, the old anticommunist Nixon has to be considered. Nixon, after all, had been the White House operations officer for Bay of Pigs planning during the Eisenhower administration, and had numerous business and political ties to Cuban exiles associated with his friend Bebe Rebozo. Over the years, Nixon also developed a relationship with prominent Somoza lobbyists, who threw powerful political support his way during the 1960 campaign. And one of his biggest backers, Howard Hughes, was negotiating business deals with Somoza in 1971 and 1972. Nixon may well have shared the concern of such constituencies that Torrijos would stir up radicalism in Central America and the Caribbean.

The White House war against Torrijos was curtailed only by a setback on another battle front: Watergate. The capture of Hunt and his burglars pushed Nixon into a hasty cover-up of the crimes that Hunt and Liddy had committed on his behalf—up to and including assassination plots. Torrijos, at last, gained a little more room to maneuver. His troubles were not over: The canal lobby remained as vigorous as ever (as he would see in 1977), and militant Panamanian and Cuban exiles continued their raids against property of his regime. But no longer were the hired guns of the President of the United States out for his life. ❑

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THE PENGUIN BOOK OF WOMEN POETS, edited by Carol Cosman, Joan Keefe, and Kathleen Weaver. Viking Press/Penguin Books, 396 pp., $15.00 hardcover, $4.95 paper.

The glory and the grief

WILLIAM STAFFORD

THIS BOOK FROM ANother nation, the women, I started to read, holding my head in my hands and staring. The pages began to persuade me: I belonged here, or at least I wanted my nation allied with this one.

The Penguin Book of Women Poets is a big rich package of literature by any standard. In terms of its special area it is a culmination, the arrival of a text that realizes centuries of accomplishment by women around the world.

Recent interest in foreign literatures and a surge in translation have helped enable a book such as this. And the editors, by reason of these new interests and resources, have arrived at the stage of putting together a resounding volume "intended to correct a long neglect."

An effort so well sustained as this one, and so cogent, does not deserve the quibbles that usually plague an anthologist: those inevitable flaws deriving from limited space and the restrictions that always abide, like the varying adequacies of translators. This book carries the signs of success, achieved by industry, breadth of research, and full commitment to fairness.

Reading poems from across 3500 years, from about forty different traditions, and finding the power of feelings in common, one does have a new sense of women as a nation, or a United Nations of an ideal kind. It is exhilarating to explore a heritage brought into greater clarity by selection. The poems themselves are enough to provide many connections across centuries and divergent traditions; other elements in the book advance this coherence. The organization is chronological, with five periods: the ancient world, starting before 1500 B.C.; the middle period, 600–1500; the Renaissance and its contemporaries, 1500–1800; the nineteenth century; and the twentieth century. Of these, the largest section—300 of the 400 pages—is the twentieth century, but substantial representations establish the feel of each era.

The editors have reached beyond the parochialism of many anthologies. There are poems from Egypt, India, China, and Greece, and poems translated from exotic languages—the various Americas of literary exploration today. Each poet is introduced by a paragraph that establishes her place in the relevant tradition, with sometimes a note about the translation used, and pertinent remarks that link poet and literary opinion. The short passages are direct, and pitched for the convenience of the general reader: it is possible to follow unfolding literary trends and their connections with history.

But it is more than just connection with history. Because poets catch onto particulars, these far-off times and places come to life—fervor, thought, experience combine, sometimes in even a brief reference that could come home anywhere:

The cherry blossoms
have lost their fragrance.
You should have come
before the wind.

(Princess Shikishi [d. 1201], translated by Hiroaki Sato)

Sometimes the voice is a nearer, familiar voice, without the barrier of translation, as in Emily Brontë:

I'll walk, but not in old heroic traces,
And not in paths of high morality,
And not among the half-distinguished faces,
The clouded forms of long-past history.

I'll walk where my own nature would be leading:
It vexes me to choose another guide:
Where the grey flocks in ferny glens are feeding;
Where the wild wind blows on the mountain-side.

What have those lonely mountains worth revealing?
More glory and more grief than I can tell:
The earth that wakes one *human heart to feeling*
Can centre both the worlds of Heaven and Hell.

But it is not always the poems originally in English that flourish best; there are brave translators, ready for the venture into the possibility of a new poem that a good translation is. The new version has to live; it has to fly, or come to the surface with its centuries on it, and find its way to us. Marvelously, some of these poems do that. Where there are gaps and hollows in a book of translations, one must wonder: Do the cultures and epochs not present in full proportion lack poems, or do they lack in the efforts necessary to bring something over?

Sometimes the original (one suspects) and the translator (one knows), luckily converging, clench together to

WILLIAM STAFFORD's latest book is Writing the Australian Crawl, *published by the University of Michigan Press.* The Penguin Book of Women Poets *will be published on March 29.*

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make an emphatic modern poem. An example is Richard Wilbur's translation of Anna Akhmatova's "Lot's Wife":

The just man followed then his angel guide
Where he strode on the black highway, hulking and bright;
But a wild grief in his wife's bosom cried,
Look back, it is not too late for a last sight

Of the red towers of your native Sodom, the square
Where once you sang, the gardens you shall mourn,
And the tall house with empty windows where
You loved your husband and your babes were born.

She turned, and looking on the bitter view
Her eyes were welded shut by mortal pain;
Into transparent salt her body grew,
And her quick feet were rooted in the plain.

Who would waste tears upon her? Is she not
The least of our losses, this unhappy wife?
Yet in my heart she will not be forgot
Who, for a single glance, gave up her life.

In this same section, the twentieth century, one of the high points of the collection occurs: a group of Russian poets, Zinaida Hippius, Anna Akhmatova, Marina Tsvetayeva, combined with translators like Temira Pachmuss, Richard McKane, Robert Tracy, Richard Wilbur, and Elaine Feinstein. These poems deserve reading at length, but quick effects can be glimpsed, as in a little turn of Marina Tsvetayeva's "Poem of the End," translated by Elaine Feinstein:

There was a body once, wanted to
live no longer wants to live.

It is in the latest parts of the book that one feels how difficult the choices must have been. The editors say, ". . . for reasons of space, most of the younger contemporary poets have been excluded in order to make room for the preceding generations who are in greater danger of being neglected." Even so, the twentieth century takes up more than half of the total space, and does include a satisfying array of current writers. In choosing, the editors have had to juggle proportions that can never satisfy everyone, and particularly so as much of the current section has to live by recent translations that happen to be available.

Besides the Russian portion cited earlier, there are strong representations from many languages: Polish, Hungarian, German, Yiddish, languages from all over Europe; poems from Syria, Lebanon, China, Israel, Afghanistan, Turkey, Uruguay. . . .

There is a notable poem from Mozambique, by Noémia da Sousa, that begins: "When I was born in the great house on the bank of the sea/ It was midday and the sun shone on the Indian Ocean." There is a wonderfully strange poem by Alfonsina Storni of Argentina that ends:

And on my eyelids,
a tear swells
older than my body.

For the portions originally in English in the final section it will be harder to satisfy readers: Where are the individual favorites? But choices had to be made—interesting choices.

Here are some from the end of the book. Consider Gwendolyn Brooks's, from "A Sunset of the City":

My husband and lovers are pleasant or somewhat polite
And night is night.

It is a real chill out,
The genuine thing.
I am not deceived, I do not think it is still summer
Because sun stays and birds continue to sing.

It is summer-gone that I see, it is summer-gone.
The sweet flowers indrying and dying down,
The grasses forgetting their blaze and consenting to brown.

It is a real chill out. . . .

And for a finale, for its scope, its reach, Charlotte Mew's "Fame":

Sometimes in the over-heated house,
but not for long,
Smirking and speaking rather loud,
I see myself among the crowd,
Where no one fits the singer to his song,
Or sifts the unpainted from the painted faces
Of the people who are always on my stair;
They were not with me when I walked in heavenly places;
But could I spare
In the blind Earth's great silences and spaces,
The din, the scuffle, the long stare
If I went back and it was not there?
Back to the old known things that are the new,
The folded glory of the gorse, the sweet-briar air,
To the larks that cannot praise us, knowing nothing of what we do,
And the divine, wise trees that do not care.
Yet, to leave Fame, still with such eyes and that bright hair!
God! If I might! And before I go hence
Take in her stead
To our tossed bed
One little dream, no matter how small, how wild.
Just now, I think I found it in a field, under a fence—
A frail, dead, new-born lamb, ghostly and pitiful and white,
A blot upon the night,
The moon's dropped child! ❏

("Lot's Wife" from *Walking to Sleep: New Poems and Translations*. © 1969 by Richard Wilbur. Reprinted by permission of Harcourt Brace Jovanovich Inc. "Fame" reprinted by permission of Duckworth & Co., London.)

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THE LION'S LAST ROAR: Suez, 1956, by Chester L. Cooper. Harper & Row, 310 pp., $12.95.

Watershed of the Cold War

WALTER LAFEBER

CHESTER COOPER SEEMS to have a penchant for dying empires. His career as a foreign service officer included a stint as a U.S. intelligence officer in London during the 1956 Suez crisis, and a role in the development of American policy for Vietnam during the 1950s and 1960s. The latter he recounted in his prize-winning *Lost Crusade*. Cooper has become an important chronicler, a sort of nonphilosophical Thucydides, of the continuing saga of how the East was lost. In the present book he analyzes how the British and French, with considerable help from Washington, humiliated themselves while their Mediterranean empires slipped away.

Early in November 1956, the British, French, and Israelis tried to overthrow Egypt's Gamal Abdel Nasser, who had seized the Suez Canal after the United States refused to help him build the Aswan Dam. Israel carried out its part of the military campaign; British and French troops, however, moved so slowly toward the canal that the United States, afraid that the conflict would allow the Soviets to support Nasser, stepped in and saved Egypt by forcing a disengagement. *The Lion's Last Roar* is the best account we have of the affair. The story is spiced with Cooper's personal recollections of secret conversations, the incompetence of British officials, and a gloomy post-Suez London—where the establishment was shocked by the opening of *Look Back in Anger*, and many of the young, having decided their "future now lay across the seas," began to emigrate.

Cooper, however, wants to go beyond mere reminiscences to suggest two significant themes, or lessons of history. He first argues that Suez was nothing less than the watershed of the era that stretches from 1945 to our own time. It produced the death rattle of the British and French empires, shredded the Western alliance (to the point where, as Cooper observes, the British refused a decade later to help in Vietnam because of their embittered and still green memories of United States opposition in 1956), accelerated decolonization around the globe, and gave the Soviets their first major toehold in the Middle East.

He is correct on all counts. During the autumn of 1956 the old Western imperialists failed to reclaim their empires, and the new Russian imperialists had to invade Hungary to save theirs. That date marks the exact point when the first Cold War, waged almost exclusively between the two superpowers, became a new, second Cold War in which each alliance system fragmented and the so-called Third World transfigured international affairs. Cooper's story provides insight into how the new era was born in the mid-1950s.

He recounts, for example, that after Nasser suddenly seized the canal in July 1956, British officials confidently predicted the "Gyppos"—their derisive name for Egyptians when "wogs" wore thin—could not operate the waterway without the help of foreign pilots.

Amateur artists vied with one another as they sketched their impressions of what the Canal would be like by Christmas. One I remember in particular drew his picture on the United Service Club's linen tablecloth. His piece of art portrayed the Canal solidly stacked with upright ships, bows or sterns stuck deep in the silt.

Such racism did not abate even after news reached London that the "Gyppos" somehow had moved 42 ships through the canal in the same time the British had normally needed to move 39. Not only was declining British power incapable of controlling the decolonization process, but Whitehall officials did not even understand what was going on.

COOPER BLUNTLY STATES his second major theme at the outset: "In the cold, more objective light of history," he observes, "we see a stage [in 1956] crowded with dupes, naifs, bullies, and rascals. There were no heroes." British Prime Minister Anthony Eden thus appears as a sick, tragically indecisive man who blamed his own failures on the United States. In an interesting piece of revisionism, however, Cooper argues that the British military leaders were even more indecisive than Eden, and that they, not the prime minister, were primarily responsible for mucking up the invasion plans. French leaders are pictured as scared, ruthless, and short-sighted; the Israelis as likewise scared and short-sighted, yet the most successful of the lot; the Soviets as hypocritical bluffers; John Foster Dulles as duplicitous and insensitive; and Dwight Eisenhower as uninformed and rather stupid.

The accuracy of these last two portraits, however, can be questioned by the evidence that Cooper himself presents. The British, Israelis, and several influential scholars (especially Herman Finer in *Dulles Over Suez*) have blasted the secretary of state for his failure to help America's closest allies at their moment of need. But Cooper's story, although not his conclusions, shows that Dulles deeply and accurately understood the colonial problem. When he had to choose between past colonialism and future Third World independence, he made the right choice, at least in 1956. If Dulles was duplicitous in the crucial meetings before the invasion attempt, it was probably due to his comprehension that the British and French were being even less honest with him than he was with them.

Perhaps because of the blinders imposed by his duties in London, Cooper

Suez was nothing less than the watershed of an era. It sounded the death rattle of colonialism.

WALTER LAFEBER is a professor of history at Cornell University. His latest book is The Panama Canal: The Crisis in Historical Perspective.

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"What we can't stand is the goddamn hesitation waltz while Hungary is burning."

fails to emphasize that throughout 1956, and particularly in October and November, Dulles was preoccupied not with the Middle East but with the de-Stalinization process in Eastern Europe. He interpreted Middle Eastern developments within the context of the United States and the Soviet Union; not the United States, Western Europe, and Israel. Recent studies have shown that he devoted much attention at this time to encouraging evolution in Poland and Hungary because he knew that Khrushchev would never tolerate revolution. The famous policy of "liberation," Dulles understood privately, had sharply defined limits. But Cooper never mentions this preoccupation in the first half of the book and later deals with it only cursorily. The prism through which Dulles and Eisenhower viewed the Middle East is missing from this account—much as it was missed by London and Paris officials in 1956 when they rushed to condemn U.S. policy.

Given an understanding of Dulles's concerns, not to mention the perspective of two decades, one wonders how even the staunchest proimperial British historian will be able to rationalize Whitehall's blunders in 1956. On the other hand, Dulles's role in the affair —perhaps, indeed, his overall record as secretary of state—seems ripe for reevaluation. "The devil and John Foster Dulles," to borrow the title of Townsend Hoopes's widely read biography, no longer suffices to explain the complexities of U.S. policy during the 1950s.

Cooper also dismisses Eisenhower too quickly: "The President seemed to have little talent and less concern for the complexities of foreign affairs." But Cooper also records how Eisenhower warned the British and French that using force was shortsighted and an invitation for Soviet involvement. He told the allies several times that the United States would not commit military force to the enterprise, in part because Eisenhower insisted that congressional consent had to be obtained before the commitment could be made. The President hoped to "deflate" Nasser while keeping the canal open to Western influence, but he informed Eden privately and publicly that only diplomacy, not force, could achieve those goals.

The two Americans wavered only once. Cooper's account of the moment is the most important new information in the book. During the early hours of November 3, as Israeli armies drove across the Sinai, Eden and his commanders could not bring themselves to launch their own attack through Suez to finish off Nasser. The British resembled a once-great prize fighter, beset by age and illness, who no longer trusted his strength but could not afford to retire from the ring. At that point, Robert Amory, Cooper's superior in the CIA, called. He "shouted so loudly that I could have heard him across the Atlantic without a telephone." Cooper was to tell his British friends " 'to comply with the goddamn cease-fire [demanded by the United States and the UN], or go ahead with the goddamn invasion. Either way, we'll back 'em up if they do it fast. What we can't stand is their goddamn hesitation waltz while Hungary is burning!' "

Eisenhower and Dulles had prophetically warned their Western partners not to use force, but when the partners persisted, the Americans were willing to support one quick finishing thrust in order to free themselves of the Middle East crisis. They wanted to concentrate global attention on Hungary. Resembling the punch-drunk fighter, Eden could not muster the final blow. Eisenhower (whom not even the British or French accused of being stupid about military operations) lost patience and applied political and economic pressure brutally to force the invaders out of Egypt.

Cooper's book is a valuable contribution to Cold War historiography. His inside stories provide fresh insights into policymaking on both sides of the Atlantic. But his larger themes are correct only in part. He is right that the 1956 events ushered in a new era. Since that era now reaches to the late 1970s, understanding its conception and birth is crucial. Cooper, however, does not advance that understanding when he argues that all the midwives were "dupes," "naifs," and so on. His own evidence shows that the United States leaders seemed to understand the new era was being born in the Middle East because the old colonialism was necessarily dying.

The British Empire, therefore, did not go out with a "last roar." It passed away with only a whimper because Dulles and Eisenhower, as well as Nasser, had their hands on its throat. ❑

PATRIOT OR TRAITOR: The Case of General Mihailovich. Proceedings and Report of the Commission of Inquiry of the Committee for a Fair Trial for Draja Mihailovich, edited by David Martin. Hoover Institution Press, 499 pp., $19.00.

The bloody hills of Serbia

IVO BANAC

A SET OF SIMULTANEOUS civil wars began in Yugoslavia with that country's defeat and dismemberment by the Axis powers in 1941. One important element in these civil wars was the Chetniks, the royalist and overwhelmingly Serb-based guerrilla movement whose cause the Western allies originally supported and then abandoned in favor of Tito's Partisans. In March 1946, Tito's security police finally trapped General Draža Mihailović, the chief of the Chetniks; three months later came the pitiless denouement of the struggle between Chetniks and Partisans, as Mihailović was tried before the Military Council of Yugoslavia's Supreme Court, condemned to death, and executed.

Mihailović's trial attracted much attention in the West. For many it was difficult to believe that a commander who had been hailed during the early stages of the war as the first resistance hero in Europe, could really be guilty

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As before, in Ottoman times, the Chetniks could choose submission in the lowlands, or instead, the freedom of the green hills of Serbia.

of collaboration and war crimes. A group of Americans of diverse political sentiments—among them Sol Levitas, Christopher Emmet, Dorothy Thompson, Norman Thomas, Frank J. Lausche, John Dewey, and Clare Boothe Luce—formed a defense committee. The committee generated considerable notice and even prompted strong American diplomatic representations, but it was not within its power to moderate the court's verdict.

The proceedings and the report of the committee's Commission of Inquiry have now been published. The bulk of this unimpressive record consists of the testimony of American officials who worked with Mihailović and of grounded airmen rescued by his men. The witnesses related how they were touched with Chetnik hospitality, which was generous, especially in light of the guerrillas' obvious want; how they observed no evidence of collaboration with the Germans; how they witnessed outpourings of popular reverence for the general; and how their superiors in each instance had led them to expect the very opposite.

No reason exists to question the accuracy of these accounts. They are no doubt all true, as far as they go. And here we encounter the principal failing of this volume and of the Commission of Inquiry. David Martin exemplifies this failing in his inability to appreciate the Chetnik movement, and indeed the whole situation in Yugoslavia, in all of its nuances. As one of the committee's moving spirits and the author of the essay that introduces the report, he seems indignant at the idea that Mihailović could have maintained amity with Allied representatives while pursuing an equally well-documented tactical alliance with the Italians and Germans—which the general understandably did not advertise to outsiders. For Martin, however, there are only two possibilities: Mihailović was either a "patriot" or a "traitor." This without ever troubling to consider what these categories could mean in Yugoslavia's intricate context.

Wartime Yugoslavia cannot be understood without a consideration of interwar developments and of the policies pursued by the Axis occupiers after April 1941. Briefly (and at the risk of oversimplification), most of Yugoslavia's problems had to do with the marked inability of both the interwar Belgrade regimes and of the wartime occupiers to satisfy the national aspirations of all—or even most—of the country's constituent nationalities.

Interwar Yugoslavia was dominated by the Serbs, the most numerous nationality but not the absolute majority. Serbian political leaders favored the maintenance of a unitary Yugoslavia on their own terms, with little regard for the other South Slav communities. As a result, some non-Serb nationalities—notably the Croats—opted increasingly for independence, seeking to realize their aspirations outside the framework of a Yugoslavian country.

For their part, the occupiers (Germany, Italy, and their allies) set out to destroy Yugoslavia as a state. They partitioned most of Yugoslavia's territory among themselves in a manner that could not fail to offend the Serbs. By way of contrast, Germany and Italy sought to please the Croats by permitting the establishment of the Independent State of Croatia. Yet they furnished this state with an unrepresentative and intolerant government and then denied it much of Dalmatia, the cradle of Croat statehood. Moreover, the Pavelić regime in Croatia initiated a senseless, indiscriminate, and brutal repression against the Serbs. In short, the occupiers provoked Serb insurgency, but did not elicit much loyalty from the other nationalities.

*MIHAILOVIĆ WAS PRO*pelled to the head of the Serb resistance by a series of accidents, and within the penumbra of his command, kindred Serb insurgents emulated his refusal to surrender. Because the Chetniks were a diffuse and often desperate group, Mihailović could not ultimately control all of these fighting bands. In fact, their activity best fitted the mold of time-honored Balkan outlawry.

Like the *hajduks* of Ottoman times, the Chetniks could choose between submission in the lowlands and the freedom of the "green Serbian hills." They opted for the highlands, to survive as an alternative, and above all to avenge the Serb sufferings ("to pursue [the enemy] for as long as there were any ashes in his hearth"). The enemy was not so much the Axis soldiers, well-equipped and protected in the cities and along the main communication routes, whose liquidation provoked costly reprisals against the Serb civilians. Rather, the Chetniks increasingly countered Pavelić's terror with their own countermeasures, collectively directed against the Croats and Bosnian-Hercegovinian Muslims ("a bitter herb on a bitter wound"). The first act of Yugoslavia's civil war was thus a kind of reciprocal nationalist jihad between the Croats and the Serbs. In this conflict, the Chetniks championed a vision of a royalist Serb-dominated Yugoslavia, cleansed of all "treacherous" elements and based on the traditional Serb values.

From London, the situation appeared far simpler. The restoration of Yugoslavia, a Chetnik goal, was a cause supported by Britain, and one that presumed an Axis defeat. In addition, the Chetniks were harassing the enemy, which satisfied the requirements of Churchill's strategy to "set Europe ablaze" through the active promotion of "irregular" warfare (basically subversion and sabotage). Had matters rested there, the remainder of the war would most likely have been expended in intermittent disputes over the extent of British largesse to the Chetniks. But such wrangles were overshadowed by the emergence of the Partisans, a resistance movement shaped by the Communist party of Yugoslavia.

Cooperation between the Chetniks and the Partisans was attempted in 1941. This failed, and it matters not a bit who was responsible for the failure. The civil war between the two groups became inevitable as soon as Mihailović understood that the Communists' aim was above all a revolutionary seizure of power. Nor does it matter that the Communists had a great many advantages over the Chetniks, not least of all a program which called for the construction of a new, federal Yugoslavia, free of national and class inequalities; nor that the Partisans mitigated the severity of the original Croat-Serb civil war. Neither did the

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Chetniks succumb because they were democrats and therefore no match for a modern Communist cadre-party. (The Chetniks did not practice pluralistic democracy, even within their own national community.) Rather Tito's victory was a foregone conclusion as soon as the Soviet army crossed into Serbia.

To be sure, the Chetniks worsened their position through collaboration with the occupiers, Mihailović less so than most of his commanders in Dalmatia, Hercegovina, and Montenegro. The Chetniks were not committed to the Italians, nor later to the Germans. They simply knew that the Axis would not collapse because of the Chetnik effort, but the Partisans just might; and they were also in need of arms and supplies. Martin feels duty bound to minimize this record, and denies it altogether in the German case. He calls it "accommodation," but it is not a matter of terminology.

Churchill cited Chetnik ties with the occupiers as the principal reason for his abandonment of Mihailović in 1943 in favor of the Partisans. But the switch was neither a case of who could kill the most Germans, nor, as Martin would have it, the result of a massive "Communist–BBC–MI6–SOE" conspiracy, although both of these factors no doubt played a part. Nevertheless, British adoption of the Partisans was influenced by several pressing strategic necessities that arose in 1943. Churchill needed a cover for the invasion of Sicily, and, after the impressive German showing in the Italian campaign, it became important to attract the attention of the Germans away from the intended battlefields of France. In either case, vital guerrilla movements were needed in the Balkans, and the Chetniks no longer qualified as such. The Partisans did.

It goes without saying that the Chetnik veterans have not forgiven Churchill's expediency. (Churchill himself came to rue his decision until Moscow's break with Belgrade in 1948. Sir Winston's "foresight" was thus rehabilitated by none other than Stalin.) If it is any comfort, the Chetniks should console themselves with the knowledge that the Polish Home Army never collaborated with the Germans, but was abandoned by the West all the same.

For well over thirty years now, American conservatives and other Cold Warriors have bemoaned the abandonment of a series of clients. The tribal rite is the same from Mihailović to Chiang Ching-kuo. But it makes no sense to pin the blame on any Western leader unless one is willing to advocate military solutions. It should be reiterated that Mihailović could have won only as a result of Western military intervention. His champions must therefore demonstrate at a minimum that such a drastic course would have been in the interests of the West in its competition with the USSR. Unfortunately, this cannot be accomplished by arguing for Mihailović as such.

That leaves us with General Draža Mihailović. His execution represented the downfall of traditional, pre-Marxist Serbian nationalism. It is to his credit that he went down with dignity, without special pleading. Mihailović had led one of several sides in the horrendous and little-known carnage that took place in Yugoslavia during World War II; in the end he received as he would have given. ❑

ARMED PROGRESSIVE: General Leonard Wood, by Jack C. Lane. Presidio Press, 1114 Irwin Street, San Rafael, CA 94901; 329 pp., $16.95.

Man on horseback

ARTHUR A. EKIRCH, JR.

AS A PEOPLE, WE CAN account ourselves fortunate that Leonard Wood never quite achieved the dizzying heights of an American Caesar. The general's failure, however, did not stem from any deficiency of ambition or lack of trying. From his position as commanding officer of Theodore Roosevelt's Rough Riders in the Spanish-American War, Wood moved on easily in the next two decades to become the chief of the military wing of American progressivism. Although the Wilson administration refused for political reasons to send him to France in World War I,

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If Leonard Wood never quite became an American Caesar, it was not for any deficiency of ambition, or for lack of trying.

Wood nearly won the Republican presidential nomination in 1920, and finally became governor general of the Philippines. For one who had aspired to be a Caesar, the proconsulship of America's chief outlying colonial possession was an appropriate conclusion to a Horatio Alger–type life and career.

This is not to say that Wood was born in a log cabin. Indeed he enjoyed what must have been a rather idyllic boyhood, growing up as the son of a respected physician in a spacious home looking out toward Buzzard's Bay at the entrance to Cape Cod. Lack of family resources after his father's death, and missed chances for an appointment to West Point or Annapolis led him, with outside financial help, to Harvard Medical School. "In fact," Lane concludes, "Leonard Wood's choice of medicine as a career came more from pressure than from conviction."

Although the medical profession seemed the easiest way to honor the memory of his father and provide future support for his mother, it also thrust Wood into an identity crisis that determined his future. Stubbornly individualistic to the point of insubordination, Wood, by breaking certain stringent rules in the Boston City Hospital, invited dismissal as a junior intern. Consciously or unconsciously he had made the decision which, by foreclosing the possibility of a successful career in civilian medicine, opened the alternative of joining the Army Medical Department. "He had fulfilled his father's wishes; now he would satisfy his own."

Wood, of course, was intelligent and ambitious enough to realize that appointment as a military surgeon offered little chance for rapid promotion in the army's chain of command,

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where preferment traditionally went to line officers and West Pointers. He accordingly volunteered to accompany the troops in 1886 in the spectacular campaign to capture Geronimo. Of all the officers who had served in the battles against the Apache Indians, Wood alone, in 1898, was singled out to receive the Medal of Honor. Meanwhile he had taken up the habit of attaching himself to persons of importance. Thus he was able to attract the attention and crucial support of General Nelson A. Miles, the peacetime army's chief ranking officer, and to marry the niece of Supreme Court Justice Stephen J. Field.

In September 1895, Wood, after much politicking, was transferred to Washington, D.C. Friendships with Senator Henry Cabot Lodge and Theodore Roosevelt, and service as President McKinley's personal physician, followed. Finally, the Spanish-American War gave Wood his chance to abandon the prosaic life of a military surgeon for the more promising opportunities of combat and command. Given the combination of Wood's talents, luck, and obsessive ambition, the rest of his career seems almost inevitable.

The latter part of that career, as Lane demonstrates, was inseparably intertwined with the nationalistic Progressivism and imperialism of Theodore Roosevelt. In contrast to the emphasis in traditional American liberalism on the individual and his rights, the nationalistic Progressives stressed the power of the state. In the midst of the growing complexity of modern industrial society, they urged more government regulation and administrative controls over private enterprise. Discipline and duty, enforced by the national state, as well as an aggressive imperialist foreign policy, appealed to a military man like Wood and to the Progressives who followed Roosevelt.

IN CUBA, WOOD QUICKLY maneuvered his way to the top position of military governor, and served from 1899 to 1902. Local civilian opposition to his highhanded methods was countered by his evident success in establishing law and order and in 'sanitizing' the island. Wood was explicit in his undisguised racist contempt for the Cubans; underlying his policies was his belief that Americanization would solve all their problems for them. To Roosevelt he wrote that above all else Cuba needed "decent, candid, courageous government; good courts, good schools, all the public work we can pay for, and a businesslike way of doing things." These, of course, were goals that, whatever his methods, "must have warmed the hearts of American progressives," as Lane puts it. On the plus side, Wood, with his medical background, gave full support to the work of Carlos Finlay and Walter Reed in stamping out yellow fever. But sanitation was not statesmanship, and, as Lane points out, Wood's achievements "were *American* not *Cuban* achievements." Accordingly, in the eyes of the Cubans Wood was the archetype of the paternalistic American, the exemplar of the rising Progressive imperialists.

The beginning of the twentieth century saw significant changes in American military institutions, changes in which Wood played a major role. As the army turned from fighting Indians to colonial administration, officers with executive and political skills were needed. American Progressives, building on European experience, now accomplished a military managerial revolution via the passsage of the General Staff Act of 1903. At the same time, the historic conflict between a standing army and a militia of citizen volunteers was resolved by the establishment of a federalized reserve component, or National Guard.

Meanwhile, with his friend TR in the White House, Wood was promoted over the heads of his seniors, all the way to Chief of Staff in 1910. Carefully concealed from the public were the semiparalysis of Wood's left arm and an operation for a brain tumor soon after he was appointed. Thoroughly attuned to what Lane calls the neo-Hamiltonian or New Nationalist version of American progressivism, Wood pushed through a reorganization of the army that made possible its efficient transformation into the AEF of World War I. Vital to all these shifts was the leadership and planning of such congenial militaristic secretaries of war as Elihu Root and Henry Stimson, both of whom were ardent Wood backers.

Conscription was the goal of the new military planners, although few dared use the term until 1917. As World War I approached, Wood began his crusade to enhance the role of the army through citizens' training camps—the Plattsburgh idea—which, he hoped, would eventuate in universal military training. From his new post as commanding general in charge of the eastern United States, Wood, helped as usual by TR, challenged the Wilson administration's policy of peace and neutrality by his own flagrant propaganda for preparedness and war. Not until his young admirer Douglas MacArthur assumed a like role after World War II, did any officer so directly contest the American tradition of civil supremacy. Lane calls these efforts for preparedness "a Pyrrhic victory" for Wood since President Wilson and Secretary of War Newton D. Baker, reinforced by General Pershing's wishes, exacted their revenge by confining Wood to training troops at home all through the war. But, in a larger sense, it was perhaps the Wood-Roosevelt political propaganda for preparedness that forced the President's hand and tipped the scales against American neutrality after 1915.

In any case, although he made a desperate effort as Roosevelt's heir to win the Republican 1920 presidential nomination, Wood's career was now going downhill. What he had to offer were appeals for law and order and Americanism that reflected his own racism and conservatism. But as the "red scare" subsided, Harding's "normalcy" was much closer to popular desires. Fighting to the end, Wood used his semiexile as governor general of the Philippines to resist the independence movement there. He succumbed in 1927, at the age of 67, to his third brain operation: still governor general, still aggressively planning for his own future, and without having drafted a will.

Lane's book, which is really an intellectual and military study of Wood's career and influence rather than a complete biography, nevertheless largely supersedes the more personal and fuller, but uncritical, life by Hermann Hagedorn. Lane, a professor at Rollins College who specializes in military history, leaves little doubt that Wood aimed at becoming the quintessential and proverbial "man on horseback," all the more dangerous because he exemplified the social imperialist ideals of such Progressives as Theodore Roosevelt. Contrary to those who, like Professor Morris Janowitz, hold Wood up as a model for today's soldiers, Lane declares: "My own view is that Wood's career should always serve as an example of what American officers ought to avoid."

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F I L M

JOAN CRAWFORD, by Bob Thomas, Simon & Schuster, 315 pp., $10.95.

MOMMIE DEAREST, by Christina Crawford. William Morrow, 286 pp., $9.95.

THE ACTOR'S LIFE: Journals 1956–1976, by Charlton Heston. Dutton, 482 pp., $12.95.

LAUREN BACALL BY MYSELF, by Lauren Bacall. Knopf, 377 pp., $10.95.

Christina's world

STEPHEN HARVEY

A FEW YEARS AGO, I WROTE a short book about Joan Crawford's film career. What had most intrigued me about her was the fact that an actress of less than prodigal gifts had managed to sustain a 40-year career as a star thanks largely to her chameleonic instinct to adapt her colors to suit the tenor of the times—from her early days as Hollywood's glorified Jazz Baby to her forays into grand guignol in the 1960s. In the book, I charted her various incarnations, starting with the Dangerous Diana of *Our Dancing Daughters*, through Mildred Pierce, to Blanche Hudson. But it never occurred to me that for a lot of people, my dogged emphasis on her professional life would be no more than an exercise in pedantry. They wanted answers to different questions: whether Crawford had actually lent her talents to that rumored blue movie in her pre-MGM days; whether her treatment of her real-life progeny was a better preparation for the role of the batty sadist in *Baby Jane* than for that of the whining martyr.

Having little affinity for the Louella Parsons school of journalism, I found all this curiosity about Crawford's private activities a little morbid, but there was a certain logic to it all the same. What exalts the genuine star above the numberless hordes of mere SAG cardholders is the projection of a personality greater than the sum of his or her filmography. "Katharine Hepburn" or "John Wayne" or "Barbra Streisand" or "Burt Reynolds" isn't just a performer, but a metaphor as well. Their identities in the public's mind are forged both from aspects of their fictional roles and from the factoids concerning their private lives that they, the press, and the audience see as consistent with their movie personae.

Consciously or not, the films of such stars become an idealized form of autobiography. One of the reasons Crawford herself engendered such idolatry among a Depression-bred generation of working-class women was that her movie roles confirmed what they already knew about her: namely that their Joan had used her jungle red talons to claw her way up from the ranks of women just like them, determined to wrest for herself a fair share of glamor, romance, and material comfort—the birthright of every American girl with enough pluck to pursue them. Conversely, by the fifties her steely imperiousness in the likes of *Queen Bee* and *Johnny Guitar* was rampant, and moviegoers began to wonder whether these films revealed a new and rather unsettling facet of the offscreen Joan—a suspicion which, as it happens, was amply justified.

Hence it's no wonder that the public's appetite for the movie-star biography is so voracious—particularly when the subjects are, for obvious reasons, no longer capable of defending themselves. Book-length accounts of the living tend to be a rather bland, decorous lot, the libel statutes being what they are. Meanwhile, biographies of performers fortunate enough to expire at or near the peak of their celebrity (James Dean, Elvis) lean much more toward hagiography than character assassination, lest they alienate their natural market among the mourning admirers of the star in question. Yet woe betide that ill-fated celebrity who passes on having already outlived the members of his or her fan club.

Of the two current examples of Crawfordiana, Bob Thomas's *JOAN CRAWFORD* has been largely overlooked by both press and public—mainly, I think, because it resolutely disdains to apply Crawford's own little hatchet from *Strait-Jacket* to its subject. Previously the Boswell of Hollywood celebrities ranging from Bing Crosby and Debbie Reynolds to Harry Cohn and Irving Thalberg, Thomas has composed a coolly reasoned, well-documented account of Crawford's rise from a laundry room in Kansas City to the soundstages of MGM and beyond, to her self-imposed Elba in a New York co-op. In the process, he neither canonizes nor pillories her. If the book is a little skimpy in terms of interpretation and gives rather short shrift to her film work, it does provide a comprehensive overview of her life, hinting that her real tragedy was that she continued to believe in Joan Crawford long after the rest of the world had become agnostic.

Their Joan had used her jungle red talons to claw her way up through the ranks of women just like them.

From the start, however, *MOMMIE DEAREST* was destined to incite panting attention, and neither media hype nor the ring of truth of Christina Crawford's book entirely explains this phenomenon. What this book is really selling is the vicarious smashing of an outmoded idol. Those stars of Crawford's generation who are still in vogue (Hepburn, Davis, Bogart, and so forth) are revered as mavericks, figures believed to have transcended the tinselly bushwa of Hollywood's heyday by dint of their own unswerving integrity. Crawford, on the other hand, was the embodiment of a kind of "phony" glamor

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that nobody now wants to admit having ever been susceptible to. The "truth" about Joan Crawford may well be no more or less unsavory than that about any of her contemporaries —it's just that her irrelevance as a role model for the seventies has marked her as a likely target for iconoclasm.

CHRISTINA CRAWFORD IS not the first to parlay her status as a hapless scion of Hollywood into best-sellerdom; no fewer than two Chaplin sons have penned accounts of how doleful it was to be raised in the shadow of the world's most celebrated clown, and Brooke Hayward's *Haywire* eloquently described the travails of life *chez* Margaret Sullavan. Christina, however, has the most gothic story of all to tell, an endless litany of neglect and outright abuse. It commenced the moment Mommie decided to compensate for various romantic and professional reverses in midlife by adopting a brood of orphans whose function was to adore her more unstintingly than any husband or fan ever could. Fueled by ferocious insecurities and occasional sieges of alcoholism, Crawford retaliated with a vengeance whenever her wards threatened, however meekly, to rebel at being typecast as Sunday Supplement cherubs eternally encircling the Queen Mother.

Christina Crawford's tales of affection abruptly withdrawn, humiliation, bondage, and even incarceration are all the more convincing for the artlessness of her prose: that breathless, you'll-never-believe-this air with which she relates the more horrible episodes of her childhood. I don't question for a second the unsettling facts of her report, but there remains something faintly nauseating about the air of rectitude hanging like incense over every page. This holds also for the massive publicity job accorded this property by the publisher, as well as the tongue-clucking sympathy with which, by and large, it has been greeted by the media.

Everyone concerned has taken enormous pains to stress *Mommie Dearest*'s socially redeeming qualities as a cautionary tale of familial horror, which is rather like praising *The Exorcist* as a tract on the dangers of demon worship. This saga of parental cruelty has no universal message precisely because of Joan Crawford's celebrity status: It's the very fact that, for good or ill, a Hollywood childhood is not at all like yours or mine ever was that makes this book titillating and salable. Christina Crawford, herself a failed actress, seems to resent a life spent in the reflected glory of her mother, and yet at the same time to be more than willing to capitalize on the potency of that name. (Surely she can't believe that there would have been a market for her memoirs had Mommie been merely some anonymous suburban Medusa.)

Throughout, Christina purports to have forgiven her mother's trespasses, yet the underlying tone is almost gleefully vengeful, so clouding the book that even the figure of the author herself is obscured. Mommie comes through with the clarity of a fairy tale witch, while our Snow White heroine emerges as a featureless martyr, with little identity save that of victim of her mother's irrational rages. The need for catharsis is a more than understandable motivation under the circumstances, but one can't help wondering if the book would have been any different (or indeed, whether it would have been written at all) had La Crawford not elected in the end to leave Christina out of her will. In a perverse twist on the MGM happy fadeouts of yore, Christina is destined to earn far more extravagant sums from the proceeds of this book than she ever could have received from a cut of Mommie's relatively modest estate. The relentless hardsell of this chronicle, with the eager complicity of its author, smacks of a motive other than the quest for belated justice.

Memoirs penned by movie stars themselves operate according to different ground rules entirely, since the celebrity in question is presumably in control of the image being presented to his readers. The best examples come from those performers who can convey their public personalities in print with an added note of intimacy and candor. The problem is that the image these actor/authors think they're giving us and the impressions we're actually left with are often radically different. For reasons I don't quite understand, actresses tend to produce more interesting accounts of their lives than do their male counterparts. Apart from David Niven's effervescent, if factually capricious, *The Moon's a Balloon*, no actors have recently matched the charm of Lilli Palmer's *Change Lobsters and Dance*, the abrasive narrative sense of Hildegard Knef's *The Gift Horse*, or the keenly observant eye and rich style Anne Baxter displayed in *Intermission*.

EVEN SO, CHARLTON Heston's *THE ACTOR'S LIFE* really lets the team down. This collection of excerpts from 20 years of his private journals pretends to give an inside view of the toils and satisfactions in the frantic life of a working professional, but what really comes through is the ego of someone who's taken his messianic roles a bit too seriously. From his delight at DeMille's decision to use him as the voice of God as well as the on-screen Moses, on through his ascension to the roles of official state artist abroad and national institution at home, this collection of windy pronunciamentos is practically unprecedented. "Celebrity has its drawbacks for shy people," he exclaims, as he duly records his umpteen publicity junkets, State Department tours, and appearances before Congress, and tenures as mayor of Hollywood, president of the Screen Actors Guild, board member of the American Film Institute, etc. ad infinitum. His comments on the political scene ("things are going better" in Vietnam, he concluded in 1967, four days into his second visit there), the classics ("Shakespeare *never* gets great notices," after his *Antony and Cleopatra* film flopped), and human mortality ("the sun goes down and the sun also rises" after his father's death) are all about equally illuminating.

Most unctuous of all is his Hallmark vision of himself as folksy paterfamilias whose smiling dependents (wife Lydia, otherwise known as "my girl"; stalwart son Fraser; and angelic daughter Holly) are forever rapturously waving hail or farewell to Daddy at the airport. Though Heston apparently spends more time in the air than your aver-

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age Pan Am stewardess, back home, from what we're told, the Heston household spends all *its* time coming up with cute sayings while the breadwinner is away racing chariots or parting seas. When late in this account Mrs. Heston starts getting inexplicable migraines, Heston seems temporarily nonplussed, but her symptoms don't come as a complete surprise to the attentive reader. To be fair, Heston does furnish valuable accounts of the genesis of various movie projects from first outline through production and final cut, and the book gives ample testimony to his taxing sense of discipline and dedication to his craft. However, you have to wade through some ponderous prose in order to retrieve these nuggets.

LAUREN BACALL BY MYSELF just misses being a first-class example of the genre, but the self-portrait that emerges, unlike Heston's, is so matter-of-fact and likable that her book is a pleasure to read. Unlike far too many film celebrities, she doesn't view her rise from lower-middle-class obscurity to screen prominence as a matter of manifest destiny. Without a tinge of false modesty, she describes her overnight metamorphosis from a shy, well-raised Jewish girl to the nineteen-year-old siren of *To Have and Have Not* as a phenomenon created in equal parts by ambition, luck, the ability to follow orders, and the kindness and help of many people. Among the most notable are Diana Vreeland, who started her on her modeling career; Howard Hawks, who brought her to Hollywood and molded her screen image; Bacall's affectionate, strong-willed mother; and, of course, Bogart. Bacall recalls her dazed first years in Hollywood with a welcome note of self-deprecating irony: The Look that launched a thousand magazine covers was a method of hiding the trembling chin of a teenager out of her element, and her first meeting with Bogart didn't exactly cleave the heavens asunder either. Their furtive affair (her mother didn't approve of her consorting with a man who drank, was more than twice her age, and was already married) and the mutual adjustments they had to make during their marriage are delineated with succinct honesty. Never for a moment does Bacall descend into bathos, even during her description of Bogart's bout with the cancer that killed him in 1957.

Although awed by the chance her profession granted her to mingle with some of the world's most interesting people, Bacall displays a healthy sense of her own worth, and a canny instinct for self-analysis; she's an astute judge of the sum total of her own career, tolerably proud of her accomplishments, and aware of the limitations of her talents. The whole book is refreshingly free of the acrid, self-justifying note that marred the likes of Joan Fontaine's recent autobiography. Its only real failure is one of language. Friends, family, and other notables pass through the book limned with only the vaguest of phrases—from Diana Vreeland, who, we are told, is "definitely an original"; to Cole Porter, whose parties were "incredibly good fun"; to Edward G. Robinson, "a marvelous actor." No matter, really—Bacall herself comes through with grace and clarity, and she turns out to have dimensions of which that sullen drifter who once taught Bogey how to whistle gave barely a glimmer. ❑

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LETTERS

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Crisis in Iran

I WOULD LIKE TO CONGRATULATE the author of "Political upheaval in Iran" [*INQUIRY*, Nov. 13, 1978] for writing an excellent article on the present crisis. It is extremely rare to find a perceptive article on the Iranian crisis.

ERVAND ABRAHAMIAN
City University of New York
New York, N.Y.

Settlements

CONGRATULATIONS FOR printing the well-researched article "Israeli settlements" by Edmund R. Hanauer [*INQUIRY*, Oct. 30, 1978].

Having recently returned from Israel, and with eight such trips in as many years, I can substantiate Hanauer's claim that the human rights of the Palestinians are being violated by the establishment of Israeli settlements. These settlements are causing a grave shortage of water for the Arabs, as Hanauer points out. This water shortage, I might add, is even more serious than Hanauer indicated.

MIRIAM WARD
Trinity College
Burlington, Vt.

The roots of repression

AS AN OLD "LATIN AMERICAN hand" with many years experience "south of the border," I was intrigued by Penny Lernoux's articles, "Fascism in Brazil" and "Trading in repression: Brazil" [*INQUIRY*, Nov. 27, Dec. 11, 1978].

Lernoux points up well the discouraging drift toward hard-line regimes in Latin America. What she scarcely mentions is the age-old struggle between order and chaos; wealth and poverty; slow economic growth coupled with ballooning birth rates—all of which have periodically led Latin America to the point of despair.

Military regimes become despotic; democratic regimes pander to the lowest common denominator. Corruption spreads and the economies choke on do-gooder socialist schemes. The historic reasons for the present predicament are rooted deeply in the Latins' own particular history. I think Lernoux sells it short. She describes only the evils of the military in Brazil, and spends but no time on *why* they came to power. A long story at best, but it certainly deserves a few paragraphs.

Lernoux says nothing of the millions who thronged the streets of Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo in 1964, demanding that the army depose Goulart and his crumbling regime. The magnitude of the uneasiness Brazilians felt about the Goulart government was little recognized here in the United States. Those were years of despair for Brazil. The resignation of President Janio Quadros one year after his election in 1960, left Brazilians in a state of nearly total incredulity. By 1964 they were ready for another "state of order." For several years thereafter, Brazil grew and prospered. But power corrupts. Today Brazil wants change, there is no doubt.

In spite of all apologias to the contrary, any honest observer of the Latin American scene knows that the reasons for the demise of democracy in Brazil, Argentina, and Chile go far deeper than mere military malevolence. The Spanish/Portuguese tradition of strong central government; the psychological dependence on the concept of the patron-saviour; economies that have basically been on the wrong track (import substitution) since the 1930s—to mention only a few—are the real roots of the problem.

How *does* one move toward the foundations for order and human respect on which to evolve a libertarian society in areas of the world like Latin America when military regimes violate those very foundations? But on the other hand, how do you build those same foundations in an atmosphere of chaos, economic disintegration, corruption, even murder and violence, wrought by truly inept politicians such as Peron, Allende, and Goulart?

GERRIT P. VANDER ENDE
Oakland, Calif.

Coercing youth

FRANKLY, I SEE NOTHING wrong with John Connally's Youth Service Program [*INQUIRY*, Jan. 8 & 22, 1979]. It seems little different from the requirements of the State of Israel that every youth spend one year working on their settlement farms. I think the Youth Service Program would be good for both this country and the youth.

DAVID A. MCPHERSON
Oklahoma City, Okla.

Israel has no general law that young people spend one year in settlements, though some kibbutzim require this of their youth. There is instead universal military conscription for both men and women.

Frankly, we don't think that a government that loses the mail and spends billions on cost overruns ought to be telling our children what they should do with their lives. —EDITORS

Illegal Acts

ALEKSANDR GINSBURG'S ORdeal [*INQUIRY*, Dec. 25, 1978] is not an isolated case in the Soviet Union. For according to V.M. Chkhikvadze, an associate member of the USSR. Academy of Sciences and director of its Institute of State and Law, Soviet law forbids agitation and propaganda that undermine the Soviet system.

In an article in *Soviet Studies in Philosophy* (Winter 1977–78) Chkhikvadze argues that citizens in a socialist society must have discipline, duties, and responsibilities, and he criticizes those who distort people's socialist social consciences and undermine their ideological convictions. Responding to charges that dissidents were being persecuted in the Soviet Union, Chkhikvadze crudely states dissidents are not punished for their beliefs, only their actions. And these actions include "disseminating, preparing, or storing literature" damaging to the Soviet government or social system. In other words, it's not illegal to have antisocial thoughts as long as you don't write them down.

BOB MURPHY
Pittsburgh, Penn.

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

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

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